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The situation in Afghanistan

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**The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for
international peace and security****Report of the Secretary-General****I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 68/11 and Security Council resolution 2274 (2016), in which I was requested to report every three months on developments in Afghanistan.
2. The report provides an update on the activities of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including significant humanitarian, development and human rights efforts, since the issuance of my previous report (A/71.616-S/2016/768). It also provides a summary of key political and security developments and regional and international events relating to Afghanistan.

II. Relevant developments

3. The President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, and the Chief Executive, Abdullah Abdullah, presented the Afghan National Peace and Development Framework at the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, held on 5 October, in which international partners confirmed their intention to provide \$15.2 billion in support of the country's development priorities until 2020. Ongoing tensions in the executive branch and the vote to dismiss several Cabinet ministers by the lower house of the National Assembly contributed to political volatility. This occurred against a backdrop of intensifying armed clashes between security forces and the Taliban. The names of commissioners for the electoral management bodies that are to pursue electoral reforms and prepare for elections were announced. The Government also advanced its anti-corruption agenda. A peace agreement was signed by the Government with Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin), but prospects for talks



with the Taliban have not improved. Increasing levels of violence resulted in high civilian casualties, including a disturbing number of child casualties, and significant new displacements. The rate of return of Afghan refugees and undocumented Afghans from Pakistan increased rapidly, further exacerbating the fragile humanitarian situation.

A. Political developments

4. President Ghani and Mr. Abdullah took steps to address their working relationship after a period of tensions. The two leaders held a series of meetings to discuss their differences, including on power-sharing, delegation of responsibilities between senior government officials, and high-level appointments.
5. Criticism was voiced by other senior political figures within the Government on its inner workings. On 24 October, the First Vice-President, Abdul Rashid Dostum, publicly accused the President and the Chief Executive of nepotism and ethnic bias in appointments. The offices of the President and the Chief Executive condemned the First Vice-President's statement. Other government figures also publicly stated their concerns: the President's Special Representative on Reforms and Good Governance, Ahmad Zia Massoud, underlined the need for the Government to overcome rifts in its leadership, and the Second Vice-President, Sarwar Danish, and the Second Deputy of the Chief Executive, Mohammad Mohaqiq, called attention to the need for greater power-sharing in the Government and stressed the need to improve its workings, respectively.
6. The second anniversary of the Government passed without notable incident, but underlying tensions have yet to be constructively addressed. After its earlier assertions that the political agreement of 2014 establishing the National Unity Government expired two years after its signing, the Afghan Protection and Stability Council indicated after the anniversary on 21 September that it would seek to help the Government to carry out its five-year mandate. On 1 November, the Council formed a commission to assist with mediating disputes within Government. Other opposition figures, including the former President, Hamid Karzai, and his supporters, maintained a critical stance.
7. Vocal opposition to the Government continued from the Enlightenment Movement, an ethnic Hazara group seeking the rerouting of a major electricity infrastructure project and broader representation of the younger generation of Hazaras in Government. Meanwhile, following the ceremonial reburial by Tajik activists of former King Habibullah Kalakani early in September, ethnic Pashtun protesters staged several counterdemonstrations in Kabul and in south-eastern provinces. The registered political wing Hizb-i Islami (Arghandiwal) held demonstrations across the country in support of the peace agreement of 29 September between the Government and Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin), while protests against the agreement were held in Baghlan Province.
8. In mid-November, the lower house of the National Assembly voted to dismiss senior Cabinet ministers on allegations that they had underspent their allocated development budgets. Between 12 and 15 November, the lower house of the National Assembly passed no-confidence votes on 7 of the 16 ministers summoned, namely the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Salahuddin Rabbani, the Minister of Public

Works, Mahmood Baligh, the Minister of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, Nasreen Oryakhel, the Minister of Education, Assadullah Hanif Balkhi, the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, Muhammadullah Batash, the Minister of Higher Education, Farida Momand, and the Minister of Communications and Information Technology, Abdul Razaq Wahedi. On 19 October, the Minister of Tribal Affairs, Gulab Mangal, was appointed Governor of Nangarhar Province on 19 October, and on 7 November the Minister of Information and Culture, Abdul Bari Jahani, resigned. The Ministry of Mines and Petroleum and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance have lacked appointed heads for several months. The dismissal of the Ministers of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled and of Higher Education would leave only two women ministers in the Cabinet.

9. The Government reaffirmed its commitment to implementing electoral reforms in the communiqué of the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan. On 25 September, following the parliament's failure in June to approve an earlier decree on electoral law, the Government issued a decree merging the Election Law and the Law on the Structure as well as the Duties and Authorities of the Independent Election Commission and the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission into a single piece of legislation. It incorporated some of the recommendations of the Special Electoral Reform Commission formed in 2015, including changing the composition of the Selection Committee tasked with nominating new election commissions, reducing the number of Independent Election Commission commissioners from nine to seven, and reducing the length of their tenure from six years to five with staggered terms. It also mandates the Independent Election Commission to recommend to the Cabinet the electoral constituencies for the next parliamentary and provincial council elections, within three months of its appointment.

10. The recruitment process for the incoming electoral commissions started on 28 September. A Selection Committee was established and considered candidates for electoral commissions in sessions open to civil society, the media and the international community. Two shortlists, of 21 Independent Election Commission and 15 Electoral Complaints Commission nominees, were introduced to President Ghani on 9 November, and the Selection Committee announced the names of the nominees the following day. President Ghani and Mr. Abdullah met jointly with political figures on 12 and 17 November to discuss the appointment process. Between 14 and 16 November, the shortlisted nominees were interviewed by a panel chaired by President Ghani and comprising Mr. Abdullah, the Second Vice-President, the Attorney General, the Chairperson of the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution, and a representative of the Supreme Court. The members of the election commissions were announced on 22 November. Of the 12 commissioners, 3 are women.

11. There was no substantive movement towards a peace process between the Government and the Taliban. Following a number of press reports in October, a Taliban spokesperson publicly acknowledged that a delegation from the political commission based in Qatar travelled to Pakistan to discuss various issues relating to Afghanistan with the movement's leadership and the Pakistani authorities.

12. The Government and Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin) signed a peace agreement on 29 September. Under the 25-article agreement, Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin) formally recognized the Constitution of Afghanistan and promised to halt military activity,

while the Government agreed to welcome the group's participation in politics, to request the delisting of its figures from international sanctions and to incorporate some former members into the Afghan security forces, without specifying a vetting process to determine involvement in any serious crimes involving violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law, in contravention of international law. Furthermore, the agreement guaranteed judicial immunity to Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin) members for past political and military actions and committed the Government to the conditional release of designated prisoners and detainees, as well as to ensuring the safe return of associated refugee families of the group from Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

13. On 20 October, President Ghani issued a decree to establish a six-member Joint Executive Commission with representatives from the Government and Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin) to oversee the implementation of the agreement. The Commission held its first meeting on 6 November. In a second decree, the Afghan security forces were instructed to stop fighting against militias affiliated with Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin) until their reintegration was completed. Discussions about the removal (delisting) of the group's leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, from the list of individuals sanctioned under Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) continued. To date, no formal request for the removal of Mr. Hekmatyar has been received by the Security Council Committee, either from Afghanistan as the country of origin or from the United States of America as the original listing State. On 12 November, Mr. Hekmatyar issued a statement asserting that Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin) had no links to Al-Qaida, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or any other terrorist group, a precondition for delisting.

14. The High Peace Council made some progress in developing its future configuration, finalizing a list of 52 members, completing consultations on the Afghanistan National Peace and Reconciliation Strategy and submitting a revised structure to donors on 4 October. Provincial peace councils continued to function in a reduced format, and outreach by local authorities, tribal elders and ulema remained limited owing to volatile security conditions and the status of funding, which remained under discussion.

B. Security

15. The security situation further deteriorated during the reporting period with intensifying armed clashes between the Afghan security forces and the Taliban. Overall, the number of armed clashes between January and October 2016 increased by 22 per cent over 2015, reaching its highest level since the United Nations started recording incidents in 2007 and surpassing the previous record year of 2011. Although successful in securing all provincial capitals, the Afghan security forces continued to be challenged by the Taliban across Afghanistan.

16. Throughout the fall, the Taliban maintained a high operational tempo, intensifying its pressure on the provincial capitals of Helmand, Uruzgan, Farah and Kunduz while continuing to challenge government control in key districts and attempting to cut off key highways and supply routes. Between 16 August and 17 November, the United Nations recorded 6,261 security incidents across the

country, which represented a 9 per cent increase compared with the same period in 2015 and an 18 per cent increase against the same period in 2014.

17. On 3 October, the Taliban entered the Kunduz city centre. Expelled after only one week, Taliban fighters have maintained a significant presence in the city outskirts, despite clearance operations by the Afghan security forces supported by international military forces. The Taliban also captured the district administrative centres of Ghormach (Faryab Province), Omnah (Paktika Province) and Nawah-ye Barakzai (Helmand Province), in addition to launching offensives against district centres in the north-eastern, northern, south-eastern and eastern regions. The security forces have retaken control of Ghormach only.

18. Consistent with previous trends, armed clashes during the period accounted for the majority of security incidents at 65 per cent, followed by improvised explosive devices at 18 per cent. The southern, south-eastern and eastern regions continued to account for the majority of security incidents in the country with 66 per cent of the total incidents recorded during the period.

19. Anti-government elements continued their asymmetric attacks through abductions, intimidation and assassinations. In total, from 16 August to 17 November, 183 assassinations, including 27 failed attempts, were recorded, representing a 32 per cent decrease against the same period in 2015. In addition, 80 abductions were recorded across the country, including 11 instances of mass abductions. The number of suicide attacks increased to 19 from 18 in the same period in 2015. High-profile attacks in Kabul continued, including a complex attack against the Ministry of Defence on 5 September, which resulted in 41 people killed, and for which the Taliban claimed responsibility. On 12 November, the Taliban claimed responsibility for a suicide attack against the Bagram airfield in Parwan Province, which resulted in four people killed.

20. The operational capacity of the Afghan security forces remained under strain in the areas of command and control, leadership and logistics. Some progress was achieved in improving Afghan Air Force readiness and operational engagement. In October, Afghan Army troop levels and Afghan National Police numbers reached 87 per cent and 95 per cent, respectively, of target amounts.

21. In addition to the armed conflict between the Afghan security forces and the Taliban, fighting continued with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant — Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP). Since my previous report, Afghan security forces, supported by international military assets, have conducted regular air and ground operations against ISIL-KP in both Nangarhar and Kunar Provinces. These operations have confined the group's presence in both provinces. An additional, smaller presence of ISIL-KP exists in Nuristan Province. ISIL-KP conducted four suicide attacks, including on 11 October in Kabul, on the holiday of Ashura, and on 21 November in Kabul against a Shia mosque. Other attacks claimed by ISIL-KP included a suicide attack on 31 October against the guesthouse of community leaders in the Pachir wa Agam district of Nangarhar Province and a suicide attack on 16 November against the vehicle of the presidential protection security forces in Kabul, which resulted in the death of 8 civilians and injured 13.

22. During the reporting period, 26 of the recorded incidents were either directly or indirectly against the United Nations. These included one case of killing, five

cases of intimidation and eight criminal-related incidents that affected mainly national staff members. On 22 October in Nangarhar Province, a United Nations road mission came under direct attack, including with rocket-propelled grenades. No staff sustained injuries. Owing to the deteriorating security situation, the United Nations temporarily reduced its footprint in the cities of Kunduz and Farah in October. Operations in both locations have since resumed.

C. Regional cooperation

23. Since my previous report, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have remained strained. Nevertheless, dialogue continued, including on economic cooperation. President Ghani met the Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, on the margins of the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan. Pakistan pledged \$500 million in economic assistance to Afghanistan and was publicly thanked by both the President and Mr. Abdullah. However, several members of the lower house of the National Assembly, as well as demonstrators in Paktika Province on 7 October, called upon President Ghani to reject the assistance from Pakistan and accused Pakistan of supporting terrorism, calling for its cessation. President Ghani condemned the attack in Quetta, Pakistan, on 24 October, during which at least 61 Pakistani police cadets were killed, and reiterated his call for regional cooperation against terrorism.

24. Afghanistan and India continued their close cooperation: on 14 and 15 September President Ghani visited New Delhi, where he and the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, called upon those concerned to cease providing support and safe havens to terrorists, including those who target Afghanistan and India. The Government of India pledged an additional \$1 billion in development assistance to Afghanistan and renewed its commitment to the trilateral Islamic Republic of Iran-Afghanistan-India transit corridor through the Iranian port of Chabahar. On 16 September, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan reiterated concerns that Afghanistan was increasingly being used by "a neighbour" for subversive activities inside Pakistan. On 21 September, a trilateral meeting was held between Afghanistan, India and the United States in New York, during which the countries reaffirmed a shared interest in advancing peace and security in the region and countering terrorism. On 4 October, the European Union hosted a dinner with international partners and countries, including those from the region. The European Union stated that common ground existed for regional political support of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan.

25. Afghanistan undertook efforts to deepen engagement with Gulf States, including on a peace process and cooperation on counter-terrorism. Mr. Abdullah visited Saudi Arabia from 17 to 19 October and received pledges from King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud for supporting a peace process, countering terrorist financing and providing development assistance. On 25 October, President Ghani travelled to Qatar, whose leadership committed to supporting the peace process and announced plans to open an embassy in Kabul.

26. Infrastructure development and security cooperation continued between Central Asian countries, Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. On 7 September, construction began on the Afghan section of a railway linking Herat in

western Afghanistan to the Iranian rail network. Trade and connectivity were also the focus of a visit to Herat on 30 October by the Governor of Khorasan-e Razavi Province in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Turkmenistan and Afghanistan inaugurated a rail sector connecting the Atamyrat-Imamnazar railway in Turkmenistan to Aqina in Afghanistan on 30 October. Regional cooperation on addressing security challenges and initiatives to strengthen regional economic cooperation featured at the centre of discussions at the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process Senior Officials Meeting held in New York on 23 September. The need to link infrastructure development with regional policy cooperation was further emphasized during the Regional Economic Cooperation side event held on 4 October on the margins of the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, during which regional countries welcomed five regional connectivity projects on the movement of goods, energy and data identified as priorities by Afghanistan. On 2 and 3 November, at a meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Mr. Abdullah called for support for the full membership of Afghanistan in the Organization, describing it as an important platform for regional security cooperation.

27. Afghanistan and Uzbekistan increased their engagement during the reporting period. President Ghani discussed bilateral economic cooperation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, Abdulaziz Kamilov, on 4 October, on the margins of the Brussels Conference. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, Mr. Rabbani, visited Tashkent to attend the forty-third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on 18 and 19 October. During his visit, he signed an extradition treaty with Mr. Kamilov, who reaffirmed his country's commitment to strengthening bilateral cooperation and to participating actively in all international meetings and conferences on Afghanistan.

III. Human rights

28. On 19 October, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released its report on the protection of civilians in Afghanistan covering the period from 1 January to 30 September. UNAMA documented 8,397 civilian casualties (2,562 deaths and 5,835 injuries), representing a 1 per cent decrease compared with the same period in 2015. The casualty figures include 877 women (240 deaths and 637 injured), a 12 per cent decrease compared with the same period in 2015. UNAMA attributed 61 per cent of all civilian casualties to anti-government elements; 23 per cent to pro-government forces; and 11 per cent to ground fighting between pro-government forces and anti-government elements where the responsible party could not be identified. Of the civilian casualties, 5 per cent were attributed to unexploded ordnance or explosive remnants of war. Ground engagements remained the leading cause of civilian casualties, causing 39 per cent of all civilian casualties, followed by suicide and complex attacks and improvised explosive devices. While UNAMA recorded decreases in civilian casualties attributed to suicide and complex attacks and improvised explosive devices, child casualties increased by 15 per cent compared with the same period in 2015.

29. UNAMA also documented a 67 per cent increase in civilian casualties caused by explosive remnants of war and a 72 per cent increase in civilian casualties caused

by aerial operations carried out by international and Afghan security forces. That pattern continued from September until November, with air strikes targeting anti-government elements causing civilian casualties in Nangarhar, Uruzgan and Kunduz Provinces. This included an international military air strike against the Taliban in the city of Kunduz on 3 November that resulted in the death of 32 civilians and injured 50, the majority of whom were women and children. On 2 October, the working group established by the Civilian Casualty Avoidance and Mitigation Board to draft an action plan for implementing the national policy on civilian casualty mitigation held its first meeting. Relevant ministries were advised to review their rules of engagement accordingly. As a member of the working group and an observer to the Civilian Casualty Avoidance and Mitigation Board, UNAMA provides technical input in line with international law and practices.

30. The Taliban attack on the city of Kunduz resulted in urban fighting that continued until 13 October. Between 3 and 13 October, UNAMA documented a preliminary figure of 328 civilian casualties (10 deaths and 318 injured) from incidents in the city of Kunduz and surrounding districts. The majority of civilian casualties reportedly resulted from ground fighting between the Taliban and the Afghan security forces.

31. Attacks conducted by anti-government elements directly targeting civilians or in civilian-populated areas continued. On 11 October, ISIL-KP claimed responsibility for a complex attack on a Shia shrine during the Ashura commemoration in Kabul, which resulted in the death of 19 civilians and injured 60. On 12 October in the Balkh district of Balkh Province, 18 civilians were killed and 47 injured in a remote-controlled detonation of an improvised explosive device at a Shia shrine. No group has claimed responsibility. On 10 November, a suicide attacker detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeting the German consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif, killing 4 civilians and injuring 128, including 19 women and 38 children. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On 21 November, at least 32 civilians were killed and 50 injured in a suicide attack against a Shia mosque in Kabul. ISIL-KP claimed responsibility.

32. On 18 October, UNAMA issued a report on the attack in Kabul on 23 July against ethnic Hazara demonstrators, in which 85 civilians were killed and more than 400 injured. In the report, it was concluded that the attack deliberately targeted civilians and constituted a serious violation of international humanitarian law that might amount to a war crime. It was also noted that the attack appeared to have deliberately targeted persons belonging to a specific ethnic and religious community. ISIL-KP claimed responsibility for the attack, employing language that advocated religious hatred and violence.

33. Between 1 July and 30 September, the country task force on monitoring and reporting documented and verified 438 incidents that resulted in 919 child casualties (245 deaths and 674 injuries). Ground engagements remained the leading cause of child casualties, resulting in 512 casualties, followed by improvised explosive devices, with 149 child casualties, and explosive remnants of war, with 135 child casualties. The task force attributed the remaining child casualties to tactics including aerial bombardments, incidents of targeted killing where children were bystanders, and suicide attacks.

34. The country task force attributed 411 child casualties (45 per cent), the largest number, to anti-government elements, including 324 casualties attributed to the Taliban, followed by pro-government forces (33 per cent), of which 82 per cent were attributed to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces. Five casualties were attributed to cross-border shelling. The remaining 200 child casualties could not be attributed to any party to the conflict. During the reporting period, the task force verified 38 incidents targeting or affecting health services and health-related personnel, compared with 19 in the previous quarter. The task force also verified 34 incidents targeting or affecting education and education-related personnel, 3 incidents of abductions involving 1 girl and 10 boys and 28 incidents of denial of humanitarian access. The task force verified the recruitment and use of at least nine boys. The majority of the violations were attributed to anti-government elements. The Ministry of the Interior continued to expand the number of child protection units in Afghan National Police recruitment centres and opened four new units in Daykundi, Paktiya, Takhar and Badakhshan provinces, bringing their total number throughout the country to 17.

35. The Government made efforts to address the workplace conditions for women employees and strengthen the legal framework against harassment. On 25 October, the Ministry of Women's Affairs issued a report highlighting obstacles to women's entry and career advancement in government institutions, including lack of leadership opportunities, nepotism, inadequate infrastructure and harassment. On 20 October, the United Nations completed the first round of a capacity development programme on transformational leadership for 39 women ministers and senior officials. The training was aimed at improving their leadership capacity and influence on gender equality. During the reporting period, at least nine provincial commissions on the elimination of harassment against women were established pursuant to the regulation combating such harassment approved in 2015. On 9 November, the lower house of the National Assembly approved a law on the elimination of harassment against women and girls.

36. The United Nations continued its efforts to advance Afghan women's equal and full participation in building peace and security. On 25 October, the United Nations hosted the annual Global Open Day event in Kabul on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security in parallel with events in 13 provinces focused on women and violent extremism in Afghanistan. The more than 400 participants, over half of whom were Afghan women from civil society, recognized women's crucial role in fostering a peaceful society and challenging radical ideologies by dissuading members of their families and communities from becoming violent extremists. In line with efforts facilitating the implementation of the resolution 1325 (2000) agenda, on 28 November UNAMA briefed the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security, co-chaired by Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for the second time in 2016. Together with national institutions and civil society, UNAMA conducted public awareness campaigns and training on women's rights across the country. For example, to strengthen the capacity of security sector personnel to prevent and respond to gender-based violence, UNAMA trained 525 members of policewomen councils in 20 provinces in October and November, focusing on human rights and domestic legal frameworks protecting women from violence.

37. During the annual 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence campaign from 25 November to 10 December, the United Nations supported outreach activities across the country with national institutions and civil society. This included radio programmes, theatre performances and debates aimed at mobilizing the public, as well as religious and community leaders, to address violence against women and call for investment in women and girls.

38. On 29 September, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the revised penal code after a four-year process supported by the United Nations. The revised code incorporates the required criminal provisions from the United Nations Convention against Corruption and reduces the number of crimes subject to the death penalty by more than 50 per cent. The code also incorporates other significant provisions, including all provisions of the Rome Statute relating to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, criminal liability against civilian superiors or military commanders who fail to prevent or punish subordinates who commit these crimes, and prohibition on the practice of land-grabbing with safeguards for displaced persons; and expands the 1976 definition of the crime of torture to comply with the Convention. Meanwhile, the revised version of the presidential decree as amended by the National Assembly in June formally took effect on 6 October.

IV. Implementation of the Kabul process and the coordination of development assistance

39. On 5 October, Afghanistan and the European Union co-hosted the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, attended by 75 countries and 26 international organizations. International partners confirmed their intention to provide \$15.2 billion in support of the country's development priorities until 2020. At the Conference, President Ghani and Mr. Abdullah highlighted their Government's progress in public finance, private sector promotion, agriculture and anti-corruption. They stressed the importance of Afghan-led peace processes as a facilitating factor for development. In the Conference communiqué, participants reaffirmed their commitment to the three pillars of the Transformation Decade, including Afghan-led State- and institution-building as outlined in the Afghan National Peace and Development Framework and the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework; sustained international support and funding at or near current levels until 2020 with increased aid effectiveness; and regional and international support for ending violence to foster economic development and improve regional economic cooperation, as well as for a political process towards lasting peace and reconciliation. In the communiqué, the continuing imperative to protect and implement constitutional and international human rights was acknowledged, with special attention to the rights of women and children and to combating torture, ill-treatment and discrimination.

40. The Brussels Conference was held against the backdrop of a significant drop in investment and continued economic decline. According to data released by the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency on 15 October, domestic investment decreased by 47.42 per cent and foreign direct investment by 55.68 per cent during the first half of 2016, compared with the same period in 2015. The agriculture sector was the most affected, with an 85 per cent decline in investments. The drop in

investment is attributed primarily to worsening security conditions, political volatility, pressures on the economy following the influx of returnees, and overall uncertainties on short-term economic growth rates.

41. In an effort to mitigate the consequences of dramatic declines in investment, the Government and the World Bank announced funding for community-based development initiatives. On 25 September, the Government announced that \$638 million from the International Development Association of the World Bank, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund administered by the World Bank, and the Government would be allocated to support four years of community-based development initiatives planned and overseen by community development councils.

42. The Government continued to pursue its anti-corruption agenda, including the investigation and prosecution of major corruption cases and the strengthening of the regulatory and legal framework. On 2 October, the President inaugurated the new Anti-Corruption Justice Centre. To date, the Centre has received eight cases meeting its jurisdictional threshold. The first trial was held on 12 November, resulting in the conviction of a bank branch manager for embezzlement of \$152,500. The second trial was completed on 19 November and resulted in the conviction of a high-ranking prosecutor in the Attorney General's Office for bribery and a two-and-a-half-year sentence with a fine.

43. The Government prioritized the preparation of anti-corruption strategies by the five ministries generating the most revenues, namely the Ministries of Finance; Mines and Petroleum; Commerce and Industries; Transport and Civil Aviation; and Communications and Information Technology. Following their submission to the Cabinet and review by the High Council on Governance, Justice and Anti-Corruption, the five draft strategies are currently undergoing further revision. In September, the secretariat of the High Council held consultations with the international community, civil society and government institutions on the drafting of the national anti-corruption strategy to meet the commitment made in the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework.

44. UNAMA marked the first International Day for Universal Access to Information on 28 September with outreach events held in Kabul and eight provinces. On 16 October, the President issued a decree aimed at accelerating the implementation of the Access to Information Law adopted in 2014 by requiring all government institutions to categorize confidential information, hold weekly media briefings and monthly press conferences on their activities, and send monthly performance reports to the Office of Administrative Affairs.

45. The Government continued its work on the revision of the subnational governance policy, one of the Government's short-term commitments under the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework. The draft policy was shared with donors for comments on 27 October. During the reporting period, four new district governors were appointed through a merit-based recruitment process, bringing the total number of district governors appointed by the National Unity Government under such a process to 83 out of 376 district governors.

46. The Government took steps to implement its 2015 policy on police civilianization. On 28 August, the Minister of the Interior introduced 31 civilian deputy provincial chiefs of police appointed through a merit-based process. These

deputies are expected to support the provincial chiefs of police on administrative and logistics issues, including with regard to procurement to reduce inefficient procedures and corrupt practices. UNAMA continued to support officials of the Ministry of the Interior in finalizing a detailed action plan to address key gaps and redundancies in the areas of police leadership, training, command and control, monitoring and evaluation.

V. Humanitarian assistance

47. The humanitarian situation became ever more fragile, with rapidly increasing numbers of new conflict-induced internal displacements exacerbated by the surge of more than 600,000 returning refugees and undocumented Afghans from Pakistan. Combined with the existing needs in Afghanistan, 4.5 million people currently require humanitarian assistance.

48. As at 30 November, the United Nations had recorded 515,865 newly internally displaced persons since January 2016 in 31 of the 34 provinces, with more than 240,000 displaced since mid-August. This represents the highest number of internally displaced persons on record and a 15 per cent increase compared with the same period in 2015. In October, more than 70,000 people were displaced as a result of the Taliban's attempt to take control of the city of Kunduz. An estimated 16,500 people were also displaced in the past two months in southern Afghanistan owing to intensified conflict, primarily from Helmand and Uruzgan Provinces. The United Nations and non-governmental organizations provided humanitarian assistance, including cash, health services and supplies, shelter, food and non-food items, to the displaced populations. Access constraints limited both a complete understanding of the humanitarian needs and the response thereto. As at 3 November, 63 aid workers had been abducted during 2016, compared with 93 in 2015.

49. During her visit to Afghanistan from 11 to 20 November, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons called for enhanced support for durable solutions, improved access to national identity cards for internally displaced persons and the full implementation of the national policy on internally displaced persons adopted in February 2014.

50. The number of refugees returning through the United Nations repatriation programme increased by 450 per cent since 1 July, compared with the very low numbers between January and June. By 29 November, a total of 372,282 Afghans registered as refugees had returned from Pakistan, while 2,220 had returned from the Islamic Republic of Iran and 167 from other countries. In October alone, there were 148,692 Afghan refugees newly returned from Pakistan. In November, returns slowed considerably, owing to the temporary suspension by UNHCR of facilitated registration during the winter. Between 1 and 12 November, 52,595 refugees returned to Afghanistan. According to returnee monitoring, the significant spike in return from Pakistan in the second half of the year coincided with a deterioration of the protection environment for Afghans in several areas of Pakistan and uncertainty as to whether Afghans would be able to stay in the long term in Pakistan.

51. Deportations and returns of undocumented Afghans from Pakistan also increased significantly, with more than 204,000 arrivals since 1 July compared with

nearly 34,000 for the first six months of the year. Arrivals remained steady from the Islamic Republic of Iran, averaging 30,000 to 40,000 per month, in line with seasonal trends. As at 30 November, the 642,737 undocumented Afghan returnees included 444,210 spontaneous returns (227,921 from the Islamic Republic of Iran and 216,289 from Pakistan) and 198,527 deportations (176,178 from the Islamic Republic of Iran and 22,349 from Pakistan). Returnees from Pakistan continue to cite increased policing and uncertainty over their status in Pakistan, including a fear of eviction, as the main reasons for leaving. The deadline of 15 November for all undocumented Afghans in Pakistan to acquire documentation to be issued by the Government of Afghanistan or face future deportation has passed.

52. Many of the newly displaced and returnee Afghans moving within Afghanistan are vulnerable and prone to secondary or repeated displacement because of security concerns and the limited ability of cities to absorb the influx. An assessment of more than 6,000 returnee families in the eastern region found that many faced challenges in gaining access to food, shelter and basic services, in particular health care and adequate water and sanitation.

53. Afghan migration to Europe continued at a slower pace compared with 2015, when 209,367 Afghans arrived by sea. From 1 January to 31 October 2016, 47,149 Afghans arrived in Europe by sea, representing 14 per cent of arrivals. In September 2016, that figure stood at 17 per cent.

54. Overall returnee numbers significantly decreased during the third quarter of the year, with 1,439 returnees assisted, compared with 2,639 during the second quarter out of a total of 5,478 in 2016. The International Organization for Migration assisted 731 voluntary returnees from Europe, of whom 75 per cent were men, between 1 September and 31 October 2016, compared with 188 for the same period in 2015 and 4,527 between 1 January and 31 July 2016. Almost half of the returnees departed from Germany, and increasing numbers were reported from Greece and Turkey. On 2 October, the Government of Afghanistan and the European Union issued the declaration entitled "Joint Way Forward on Migration Issues" to address and prevent "irregular migration" and returns.

55. Afghanistan remains one of three polio-endemic countries in the world. Four new polio cases were identified during the reporting period, bringing the total number of new polio cases in Afghanistan in 2016 to 12 as at 31 October 2016. The cases were reported from the east, south and south-east of the country. Efforts to eradicate polio continued but were challenged by security and access constraints. The number of children who could not be vaccinated almost doubled during the reporting period to an estimated 600,000 children in October, primarily because of insecurity, active fighting and bans by anti-government elements. This includes more than 170,000 children who were inaccessible in Kunduz Province because of bans by anti-government elements on house-to-house vaccination activities, and an estimated 300,000 children who were inaccessible in Farah Province and southern Afghanistan owing to active fighting. Accessibility improved in eastern Afghanistan owing to successful access dialogues with representatives of anti-government elements through community leaders, with the number of inaccessible children being reduced from 71,000 in August to 23,000 in October.

56. Humanitarian access constraints continue to be recorded and are associated primarily with insecurity and conflict-related road closures in the eastern, southern

and northern parts of the country. In total, 67 incidents against non-governmental organizations, the United Nations and other international organizations were registered between 1 August and 31 October, compared with 45 in the previous quarter. Four aid workers were killed and four injured during the period compared with five killed and five injured during the previous period.

57. Mine action partners, coordinated by the United Nations, cleared 287 minefields, 12 battlefields and 18 firing ranges between 1 August and 30 October, which resulted in 29 communities being declared mine-free and 67,493 individuals across 83.8 km² able to resume free movement for their activities. It is estimated that 3,795 minefields, 323 battlefields and 59 contaminated firing ranges remain, affecting 1,564 communities, along with a continued threat from pressure-plate improvised explosive devices. Since January, the United Nations and mine action partners have provided risk education concerning mines and explosive remnants of war to 466,030 returnees from Pakistan at encashment centres and other registration points.

58. On 5 September, the United Nations launched a flash appeal for \$152 million to provide life-saving assistance for internally displaced persons, undocumented returnees and registered refugees. Out of \$42.2 million in pledges so far, \$40.2 million has been received. As at 20 November, overall humanitarian funding for Afghanistan stood at \$401 million, of which \$177.7 million was designated for activities envisaged in the 2016 Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan, now 52 per cent funded. To date, the common humanitarian fund in Afghanistan has received \$46.7 million in 2016, with funding focused on emergency health care, assistance to displaced families and humanitarian assessments.

VI. Counter-narcotics

59. The Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime released the executive summary of the Afghanistan opium survey report on 23 October. In the report, it was noted that the total area under opium poppy cultivation increased by 10 per cent in 2016, to an estimated 201,000 ha. Cultivation increased particularly strongly in northern Afghanistan and in Badghis Province, and opium poppy is grown in 21 of 34 provinces, compared with 20 in 2015. For the first time since 2008, opium cultivation was reported in Jawzjan Province. With some 80,273 ha (40 per cent of the national total), Helmand remains the country's leading opium-cultivating province, followed by Badghis, Kandahar and Uruzgan Provinces.

60. The report includes estimates on potential opium production, which contain some methodological limitations in areas where a yield survey could not be undertaken owing to security constraints. Potential opium production in 2016 amounted to 4,800 tons, an increase of 43 per cent from its 2015 level of 3,300 tons. The high production can be attributed to increases in the opium yield per hectare and in the cultivation and to extremely limited eradication efforts due to funding and security constraints. Most importantly, yields increased significantly as a result of favourable weather conditions and the absence of crop disease. The nationwide increases were mostly caused by a rise in production in the western and southern regions of Afghanistan by 37 and 36 per cent, respectively. Both regions account for

84 per cent of the total opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. In addition, eradication efforts decreased by 91 per cent compared with 2015, resulting in only 355 ha, or 1 per cent, of total areas under cultivation eradicated in 2016.

61. Between 18 August and 31 October, Afghan law enforcement authorities reportedly conducted 425 counter-narcotics operations, which resulted in the seizure of 1,002 kg of heroin, 29,425 kg of morphine, 29,922 kg of opium, 5 kg of methamphetamine, 1,788 kg of hashish, 269 MDMA tablets, 35,887 kg of solid precursor chemicals and 10,753 litres of liquid precursor chemicals. In addition, 16 heroin processing laboratories were reportedly dismantled, 485 suspects arrested and 110 vehicles, 44 weapons, 74 mobile telephones and one radio seized. One member of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces was killed and six wounded in the course of the operations.

62. Ministers and heads of drug agencies from Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Pakistan and Central Asian States met in September in Dushanbe for a conference on challenges surrounding the illicit economy and in promoting the licit economy in Afghanistan, organized by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia. Investigators from Afghanistan, China, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan met on 8 November in Almaty, Kazakhstan, to review investigations of illicit precursor seizures.

VII. Mission support

63. Following the completion of preparatory activities, the next phase of the Umoja platform was launched in UNAMA on 1 November, adding more than 1,100 national staff as new users. Between 1 August and 31 October, UNAMA conducted 278 road and 623 air missions, as well as 343 reverse outreach missions, during which district representatives visited UNAMA field offices.

VIII. Observations

64. The joint commitment of Afghanistan and the international community was conclusively demonstrated at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit, held in July, and the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, held in October. At the Brussels Conference, the political will to assist Afghanistan was matched by the confirmed intention to provide \$15.2 billion to support the development priorities of Afghanistan until 2020. Not only did that amount exceed original expectations, but the discussions in Brussels also showed a deep appreciation for the challenges facing Afghanistan as it moves towards self-reliance. Combined with pledges made at the NATO Summit, Afghanistan has secured \$8 billion in security and development assistance for each of the next four years. The Government and people of Afghanistan are currently able to seize that opportunity and meet the many challenges ahead.

65. Capitalizing on the current opportunities will require overcoming complex political, security, economic and humanitarian challenges. Continuing political tensions within and outside the Government further tested the unity and cohesion of

the political leadership. Increasing numbers of security incidents and attacks placed the Afghan security forces under heavy pressure as they fought to retain control of provincial capitals and district centres. The rising numbers of internally displaced persons and returning refugees and undocumented Afghans underlined the hardships facing the Afghan population and strained humanitarian response mechanisms. Those factors, along with the ongoing economic difficulties, require the Government's determined resolve. Building on their impressive commitments at the Brussels Conference, I reiterate my call upon President Ghani and Mr. Abdullah to continue their active engagement to chart a joint way forward for the benefit of the Afghan people.

66. In recent weeks, a number of leading Afghan political figures have taken steps to play a more constructive role. Public demands to replace the Government have diminished. All stakeholders are encouraged to seek positive results so that the Government can meet the manifold challenges facing the country.

67. The commitments from the NATO Summit and the Brussels Conference provide the resources and possibility for essential reforms, including in the areas of poverty reduction, governance, the rule of law and elections, and human rights. The Afghan National Peace and Development Framework and associated national priority programmes will serve as guides for funding decisions. Their realization will require constructive dialogue on development, aid policy and reform progress.

68. Maintaining the momentum from the Brussels Conference with robust follow-up action is essential. Even with the announced levels of civilian assistance, economic growth is expected to remain slow in the coming years. The Government has brought commendable focus to reforms, including for strengthening public financial management and developing a national anti-corruption strategy, in order to safeguard the public trust and ensure the effective use of resources. Through prosecutions guided by due process, the Anti-Corruption Justice Centre, fully operational at present, can increase the public's trust in State institutions and the Government's pledge to combat corruption.

69. I am encouraged by the renewed commitment of the Government, as outlined in the Brussels Conference communiqué, to promoting and protecting women's rights and economic empowerment. The equal and meaningful participation of women in the political and economic sphere will be essential for Afghanistan to meet its development objectives. At the recent Global Open Day events held throughout the country, Afghan women underlined their role in fostering a peaceful society, including in preventing violent extremism. Those commitments need to be translated into action, including continued concrete work and national financing to implement the national action plan on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and relevant legal and policy frameworks protecting the rights of women and especially protecting women from violence.

70. I take note of the steps to implement the amended electoral legal framework and move towards preparing for elections. The nomination of candidates for electoral commissions in an open process accessible to representatives of civil society, media and the international community was a welcome development. An inclusive, consultative and transparent appointment process offers an opportunity to rebuild public trust and confidence in the electoral institutions.

71. Those encouraging steps were taken in the face of an intense conflict characterized by an increasing number of armed clashes and continuing complex attacks. While the Afghan security forces secured provincial capitals in 2016, support from the international military was at times crucial. In the absence of a comprehensive and viable peace process, predictable international support will be required for the overall sustainability of the security sector, combined with the political leadership necessary to ensure sufficient capacity and morale, in the light of high casualty rates.

72. The intensifying conflict continues to take a heavy toll on the civilian population through deaths, injuries and displacement. The evolving pattern of the conflict, in particular the increasing ground engagements, has added to the very difficult and dangerous environment for civilians and, most starkly, children. All parties to the conflict must increase efforts to ensure that civilians are protected. After the launch of the Government's national civilian casualty prevention and mitigation policy in July, it is my hope that the action plan can be completed without delay, to enable full implementation.

73. The ever-rising numbers of internally displaced persons are extremely vulnerable. Adequate assistance and mechanisms are essential to meeting their needs, including appropriate access to documentation and land. Internally displaced persons require protection and assistance from the Government, supported by national and international partners. I encourage the Government to accelerate the full implementation of the national policy on internally displaced persons, including the creation of conditions conducive to durable solutions. The fair and fast allocation of land and creation of livelihoods is integral if displaced people are to build a long-term future in their country.

74. The number of newly displaced persons is increasing in the context of an overall rise in the number of Afghans on the move. It is currently estimated that up to 1.6 million Afghans will have been internally displaced or newly returned from Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran by the end of 2016. They will require assistance, as will those who repatriate from Europe. With the inclusion of internal displacement and refugees in the Afghan National Peace and Development Framework, such issues were recognized by many at the Brussels Conference as an element compounding the country's development challenges. In addition to immediate humanitarian assistance, government initiatives to develop an overall strategy for addressing the combined needs of the displaced and returnees are crucial. I welcome the proposal for a stronger coordinated approach between the Government, donors and the United Nations in making the transition from humanitarian support for displaced people and returnee populations to their integration within communities. Without the development of concrete plans to manage the process of integration, food insecurity and poverty will continue.

75. Peace remains imperative if Afghanistan is to reach its full potential. I take note of the importance of the peace agreement of 29 September between the Government and Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin) and the latter's commitments to renounce violence and links with terrorist groups. Agreements that reduce the level of violence and promote reconciliation, including by addressing the legitimate concerns of victims of the conflict, are important steps towards lasting peace in Afghanistan. As the agreement is implemented, I urge that the rights of the victims

of serious violations of international humanitarian law and gross violations of human rights, and their families, be made a central consideration. Beyond fulfilling obligations under international law, such processes also aid in reconciliation by enabling victims and survivors of violations to let go of their grievances.

76. I regret that efforts towards direct talks between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban have not progressed further. The Taliban movement appears to remain focused on combat operations under the leadership of Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. Constructive engagement by Member States will be essential to creating conditions conducive for Afghan-led peace talks. In this regard, I note that the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan remains challenging, and I urge the two Governments to continue dialogue calibrated to promote peace and stability in their mutual interest.

77. Countries in the region have a critical role to play in supporting Afghanistan in meeting its complex political, security, humanitarian and economic challenges. I call upon them to play a constructive role in promoting stability and economic growth benefiting all countries in the region. The regional infrastructure initiatives presented at the Brussels Conference can serve as an important pathway towards prosperity and stability and should be prioritized. I am encouraged by recent tangible progress in the area of infrastructure, including transport links between Afghanistan and Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Turkmenistan, and enhanced engagement with Uzbekistan.

78. I thank all the United Nations personnel in Afghanistan and my Special Representative, Tadamichi Yamamoto, for their continued dedication under challenging conditions to fulfil our commitments in support of the people of Afghanistan.

**General Assembly
Security Council**Distr.: General
14 December 2016

Original: English

**General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 41
Question of Cyprus****Security Council
Seventy-first year****Letter dated 13 December 2016 from the Permanent
Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General**

Upon instructions from my Government, I enclose herewith two separate annexes recording the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships during the month of November 2016 (see annex II). It should also be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal airport of Tymbou.

Furthermore, I wish to inform you that the occupation regime issued illegally two notices to airmen, on 4 and 15 November, relating to exercises conducted by the Turkish Air Force.

In addition, more recently, the occupation regime has started interfering in radio frequencies, including distress and emergency frequencies of the Republic of Cyprus, thus obstructing the smooth operation of the NAVTEX service, that delivers navigational and meteorological warnings and forecasts, as well as urgent maritime safety information to ships.

The actions by Turkey are clearly aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status, by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. Additionally, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia Flight Information Region (FIR) via radio calls. Meanwhile, Nicosia FIR infringements and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. The policy of Turkey of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, has a negative impact on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus.

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It should further be underlined that the continuation of the illegal actions by Turkey creates tension during a critical period for the successful outcome of the ongoing negotiation process for a peaceful comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation. The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for adherence to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

I would be grateful if you would circulate this letter and its annexes as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nicholas **Emiliou**

Annex I to the letter dated 13 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Airborne violations

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
1 November	0728-1320	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia air control centre (ACC).
	0846-1425	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
2 November	0945-1005	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1400-1611	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1424-1444	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
3 November	0932-1106	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0940-1110	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1318-1506	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	1335-1453	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
4 November	0243-0309	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0710-0735	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
6 November	1300-1521	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
7 November	0905-1010	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1340-1500	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
8 November	0950-1100	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1325-1433	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
9 November	1248-1425	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	1305-1420	One F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1320-1416	Two F-4 and two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1425-1926	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
10 November	0920-1048	Two Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1343-1455	Two Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
11 November	0857-0917	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1108-1125	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
13 November	1328-1355	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1448-1500	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	2056-2111	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	2205-2217	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
14 November	0940-1100	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1347-1457	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1802-1816	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1846-1855	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
15 November	1628-1644	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1939-1948	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
16 November	1049-1110	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1058-1117	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1414-1434	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1627-1646	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1803-1825	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	2025-2049	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
17 November	1105-1235	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1331-1350	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1348-1444	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1429-1438	Two F-4 and two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
21 November	1045-1135	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
24 November	0836-0958	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0937-1110	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0950-1151	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1350-1500	One UH-1 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	2139-2158	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
25 November	1504-1514	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

**Annex II to the letter dated 13 December 2016 from the
Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations,
addressed to the Secretary-General**

Naval violations

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
31 October-9 November	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
8-16 November	One P-333 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
14-18 November	One S-356 Turkish submarine violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Keryneia while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
15-16 November	One F-491 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Keryneia while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
19 November	One P-336 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.



Security Council

Distr.: General
14 December 2016

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recognizing the central role that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has played in guiding the Organization in the discharge of his responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations,

Further recognizing his sustained efforts towards finding just and lasting solutions to various disputes and conflicts around the globe,

Commending the reforms that he has initiated and the many proposals that he has made on the restructuring and strengthening of the role and functioning of the United Nations system,

1. *Acknowledges* the contribution of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to international peace, security and development, his exceptional efforts to solve international problems in economic, social, environmental and cultural fields, as well as his endeavours to meet humanitarian needs and to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all;

2. *Expresses its deep appreciation* to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for his dedication to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter and to the development of friendly relations among nations.



**Security Council**

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15 December 2016

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Albania, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Viet Nam: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, 1673 (2006) of 27 April 2006, 1810 (2008) of 25 April 2008, 1977 (2011) of 20 April 2011, and 2055 (2012) of 29 June 2012,

Reaffirming that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming its decision that none of the obligations in resolution 1540 (2004) shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Remaining gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by using the rapid advances in science, technology and international commerce to that end,

Reaffirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be misused for proliferation purposes,



Recalling the decisions in resolution 2118 (2013) and resolution 2298 (2016) that member States shall inform immediately the Security Council of any violation of resolution 1540 (2004), and also *recalling* the invitation in resolution 2319 (2016) for the Joint Investigative Mechanism of the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to brief, as appropriate, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), hereafter the 1540 Committee, on relevant results of its work,

Endorsing the 2016 Comprehensive Review of the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), and noting the findings and recommendations in its final report,

Noting that not all States have presented to the 1540 Committee their national reports on implementation of resolution 1540 (2004),

Stressing the need to strengthen national measures of export control of materials related to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, consistent with resolution 1540 (2004),

Further noting that the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States, including the adoption of national laws and measures to ensure implementation of these laws, is a long-term task that will require continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels,

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts at national, regional, subregional and international levels, as appropriate, in order to strengthen a global response to the serious challenge and threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,

Stressing the importance of dialogue between the 1540 Committee and Member States, including visits to States at their invitation, and also recognizing that such a dialogue has contributed to facilitating implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), inter alia by raising awareness about the importance of presenting national reports and the utility of voluntary national implementation action plans and has helped to identify assistance needs of States,

Recognizing that many States continue to require assistance in implementing resolution 1540 (2004), and *emphasizing* the importance of providing States, in response to their requests, with effective assistance that meets their needs,

Stressing the need to reinforce the role of the 1540 Committee in providing and facilitating effective assistance, including, inter alia, in the field of State capacity-building, and collaboration among States, between the 1540 Committee and States, and between the 1540 Committee and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations in assisting States to implement resolution 1540 (2004),

Acknowledging the importance of voluntary contributions made in the field of assistance by Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations, including through the United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities,

Endorsing the valuable interaction of the Committee with relevant international, regional, and subregional organizations, *and emphasizing* the need for coordination, as appropriate, between the Committee and those organizations,

Acknowledging the enhanced ongoing cooperation among the 1540 Committee, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2001) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism,

Acknowledging that transparency and outreach make an important contribution to enhancing confidence, fostering cooperation and raising the awareness among States, including, as appropriate, in their interaction with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, and *also acknowledging* the positive role performed by civil society, inter alia industry and academia, could play in the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including by raising awareness, and that parliamentarians have a key role in enacting the necessary legislation to implement the obligations of the resolution,

Endorsing the work already carried out by the 1540 Committee, in accordance with its Programmes of Work, *and reaffirming* its continued support,

Bearing in mind the need to continue the consideration of the 1540 Committee's ability, consistent with its mandate, to review and facilitate advancing the implementation of the resolution,

Determined to facilitate the full and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004),

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* its decisions in and the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004), and *re-emphasizes* the importance for all States to implement fully and effectively that resolution;
2. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee will continue to submit to the Security Council its Programme of Work, before the end of each January, and will brief the Security Council in the first quarter of each year, *and welcomes* the continuous submission of the Annual Review on the Implementation of Resolution 1540 (2004), prepared with the assistance of the Group of Experts, within December annually;
3. *Again calls upon* all States that have not yet presented a first report on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement resolution 1540 (2004) to submit such a report to the 1540 Committee without delay, *and requests* the Committee to make available its expertise to these States, as appropriate, to facilitate the submission of such reports;
4. *Again encourages* all States that have submitted such reports to provide, when appropriate or upon the request of the 1540 Committee, additional information on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including, voluntarily, on their laws and regulations and on States' effective practices;
5. *Encourages* also States to prepare on a voluntary basis national implementation action plans, with the assistance of the 1540 Committee as

appropriate, mapping out their priorities and plans for implementing the key provisions of resolution 1540 (2004), and to submit these plans to the Committee;

6. *Encourages* all States that have not yet done so to provide the 1540 Committee with a Point of Contact for Resolution 1540 (2004), and *urges* the Committee to continue to undertake initiatives to strengthen the capacity of such Points of Contact to assist on the implementation of the resolution, upon request of States, including through the continuation on a regional basis of the Committee's Point of Contact Training Programme;

7. *Calls upon* States to take into account developments on the evolving nature of risk of proliferation and rapid advances in science and technology in their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

8. *Requests* the 1540 Committee to take note in its work, where relevant, of the continually evolving nature of the risks of proliferation, including the use by non-State actors of rapid advances in science, technology and international commerce for proliferation purposes, in the context of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

9. *Requests* that the 1540 Committee undertake additional consideration, consistent with the report of the 2016 Comprehensive Review, of the efficiency and effectiveness of the Special Political Mission that supports the Committee, *and encourages* the Committee to report to the Security Council on the findings of this evaluation, within 2017 as appropriate;

10. *Calls upon* all States to intensify their efforts to achieve full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), focusing, when and where appropriate, on areas where measures should be taken and strengthened;

11. *Urges* the 1540 Committee to continue to explore and develop an approach, with regard to implementation and reporting, that takes into account the specificity of States, *inter alia*, with respect to their ability to manufacture and export related materials, with a view to prioritizing efforts and resources where they are most needed without affecting the need for comprehensive implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

12. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee shall continue to intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004), through its Programme of Work, which includes the compilation and general examination of information on the status of States' implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and addresses all aspects of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of that resolution, particularly noting the need for more attention on: enforcement measures; measures relating to biological, chemical and nuclear weapons; proliferation finance measures; accounting for and securing related materials; and national export and transshipment controls;

13. *Encourages* States, as appropriate, to control access to intangible transfers of technology and to information that could be used for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;

14. *Recalls* its decision that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by

establishing appropriate control over related materials, and *calls upon* States that have not done so to start developing effective national control lists at the earliest opportunity for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

15. *Recalls* its decision that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws for the prohibition of activities under paragraph 2 of resolution 1540 (2004), and *requests* that the 1540 Committee hold discussions on optimal approaches on enforcement of the indicated paragraph;

16. *Encourages* the 1540 Committee to continue to engage actively in dialogue with States, including in the context of ongoing updating of the implementation data it holds, and through visits to States, at their invitation, by the Committee;

17. *Encourages* the 1540 Committee to continue to identify and compile effective implementation best practices and, upon request by a State, to share appropriate effective best practices for implementing resolution 1540 (2004) with that State;

18. *Encourages* States that have requests for assistance to provide the 1540 Committee, as appropriate, with specific details of the assistance needed, *directs* the Committee, when possible, to provide States, upon their request, with assistance in the formulation of such requests, and further *directs* the Committee to revise its assistance template;

19. *Urges* States as well as relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to inform the 1540 Committee, as appropriate, of areas in which they are able to provide assistance, and *calls upon* States as well as such organizations, if they have not done so previously, to provide the Committee with information on their ongoing assistance programmes relevant to resolution 1540 (2004);

20. *Urges* the Committee to continue strengthening its role in facilitating technical assistance for implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), in particular by engaging actively in matching offers and requests for assistance, inter alia, through a regional approach, where appropriate, as well as the holding of regional assistance conferences, which bring together States that request assistance with those offering assistance;

21. *Encourages* States to contribute funds, on a voluntary basis, to finance projects and activities, including through the United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities, to assist States in implementing their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004), including for implementing projects in response to assistance requests submitted directly by States to the Committee;

22. *Encourages* the Committee to develop, in collaboration with international, regional and subregional organizations, assistance projects to support States in implementing resolution 1540 (2004) in order to facilitate the prompt and direct response to assistance requests;

23. *Encourages* relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to enhance cooperation and information-sharing with the 1540 Committee, on the issues related to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

24. *Calls upon* relevant international, regional and subregional organizations that have not yet done so to provide the Committee with a Point of Contact or Coordinator for Resolution 1540 (2004);

25. *Encourages also* relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, to highlight the obligations of resolution 1540 (2004) in their model legislation and/or guidelines, where appropriate, pertaining to instruments under their mandate relevant to the resolution;

26. *Requests* the 1540 Committee to convene regular meetings, inter alia on the margins of the relevant sessions of the General Assembly, with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to share information and experiences on their efforts to facilitate implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), thereby contributing to promoting coordination of such efforts, as appropriate;

27. *Reiterates* the need to continue to enhance ongoing cooperation among the 1540 Committee, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2001) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism, including through, as appropriate, enhanced information sharing, coordination on visits to States, within their respective mandates, technical assistance and other issues of relevance to all three committees, *and again expresses* its intention to provide guidance to the committees on areas of common interest in order to better coordinate their efforts, and *decides* the three Committees will jointly brief once per year the Security Council on their cooperation;

28. *Requests* the 1540 Committee to continue to institute transparency measures and activities, inter alia by making the fullest possible use of the Committee's website and other agreed means of communication, *and further requests* the Committee to conduct regular meetings open to all Member States on the Committee's and Group's activities related to facilitating implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

29. *Requests* the 1540 Committee to continue to organize and participate in outreach events on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) at the international, regional, subregional, and, as appropriate, national level, including, as appropriate, inviting parliamentarians, as well as representatives of civil society, including industry and academia and promote the refinement of these outreach efforts to focus on specific thematic and regional issues related to implementation;

30. *Encourages* the 1540 Committee to continue drawing on relevant expertise, including industry, scientific and academic communities, with, as appropriate, their States' consent, which can assist States in their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

31. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.: General
19 December 2016
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 13 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 9-12 December 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) V. Churkin



Annex to the letter dated 13 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (9 December 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, three ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas in Ladhqiyyah and Damascus governorates.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,040.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of armed groups in Mu'addamiyat al-Shaykh in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups which have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 94.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 40 reports of shelling by armed groups in Aleppo governorate (22), Damascus governorate (14), Ladhqiyyah governorate (3) and Dar'a governorate (1).

In Damascus governorate, armed units affiliated with the Army of Islam opposition group used mortars and small arms to fire on Jawbar, Qasimiyah and Harasta.

In Ladhqiyyah governorate, armed units of the Ahrar al-Sham group used mortars to shell Ikku, Kinnsibba and Ayn al-Qantarah.

Armed elements of the Free Syrian Army used multiple-launch rocket systems to shell the Bayadah neighbourhood in Aleppo city.

In Aleppo governorate, the terrorist organization Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Nusrah Front) used multiple-launch rocket systems, anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers and small arms to fire on the Dahiyat al-Assad, Binyamin (three times), Jam'iyat al-Fayha', Shaykh Sa'd, 1070, Muhammed Bak (twice), Ramusah (twice), Tariq Hasan, Layramun, Tanbud, Amri, Ansari and Maqamat neighbourhoods, the Assad Military Academy (twice), the Shaykh Sa'd electricity substation and the area near the gasworks in Aleppo city.

In Damascus governorate, terrorists shelled Hawsh Nasri (twice), Irbin (four times), Bala al-Qadimah and Jawbar (three times), and the Wafidin camp.

In Dar'a governorate, terrorists shelled Namir.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours five humanitarian operations were carried out, during which the following humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians:

- Approximately 1 ton to Ma'raba in Damascus governorate
- Approximately 1 ton for the "Hope" community of Russian compatriots in Ladhqiyyah
- Approximately 9 tons to the Mahalij temporary housing area in Aleppo governorate
- Approximately 1 ton to the Hananu-3 district in Aleppo city
- Approximately 2 tons to the Ansari district in Aleppo city

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (10 December 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, three ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas in Ladhikiyah governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,043.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of armed groups in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups which have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 94.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 37 reports of shelling by armed groups in Aleppo governorate (18), Damascus governorate (12), Ladhikiyah governorate (3), Homs governorate (3) and Dar'a governorate (1).

In Damascus governorate, armed units affiliated with the Army of Islam opposition group used mortars and small arms to fire on Jawbar, Qabun, Harasta and Hawsh al-Faddaliyah.

In Ladhikiyah governorate, armed elements of the Ahrar al-Sham group used small arms to fire on Rasha and Khashkhasha and also on government troop positions near the area at elevation point 962.

Armed elements of the Free Syrian Army used mortars to shell the Salah al-Din and Ansari neighbourhoods in Aleppo city.

In Aleppo governorate, the terrorist organization Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Nusrah Front) used multiple-launch rocket systems, tube artillery, mortars and small arms to fire on the Amri, Ard al-Sabbagh, Ashrafiyah, Binyamin, Dahiyat al-Assad, Jam'iyat al-Fayha', Minyan, Ramusah, Salah al-Din, Hamdaniyah-4, Shaykh Sa'd and Maqamat neighbourhoods, and the Assad Military Academy in Aleppo city.

In Damascus governorate, the following were shelled: Irbin, Bala al-Qadimah, Hawsh Nasri, Harasta, Hawsh al-Shalq, the Wafidin camp and a sports ground in Jawbar. In Dar'a governorate, terrorists shelled Dar'a city.

In Homs governorate, units of the terrorist group Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) used tanks to shell government troop positions in areas at elevation points 821 and 838, and also blew up a car with explosives in the area near elevation point 414.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (11 December 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, two ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas in Ladhikiyah governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,045.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of armed groups in Mu'addamiyat al-Shaykh in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups which have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 94.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 36 reports of shelling by illegal armed groups in Aleppo governorate (19), Damascus governorate (14), Ladhikiyah governorate (1), Hama governorate (1) and Dar'a governorate (1).

In Damascus governorate, armed units affiliated with the Army of Islam opposition group used mortars and small arms to fire on Harasta and the area near the Abbasiyin stadium in Jawbar.

Ahrar al-Sham fighters used multiple-launch rocket systems, mortars and small arms to fire on the Sayf al-Dawlah and Mashariqah neighbourhoods in Aleppo governorate, and also on Rasha in Ladhikiyah governorate.

In Aleppo city, groups from the terrorist organization Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Nusrah Front) used multiple-launch rocket systems, anti-tank guided missiles, tube artillery, mortars and small arms to fire on the Binyamin (twice), Dahiyat al-Assad (twice), Maqamat (twice), Shaykh Sa'd, Layramun, Jam'iyat al-Zahra', Ramusah, Salah al-Din, Amri, Qasr al-Wali and Jam'iyat al-Fayha' (twice) neighbourhoods, the Assad Military Academy and the watermelon market.

In Damascus governorate, the following were shelled: Jawbar, Hawsh Nasri, Hawsh al-Shalq, Irbin (twice), Bala al-Qadimah, Harasta (twice), a sports ground (twice) and the Wafidin camp in Jawbar.

Terrorists also shelled Muhhaja in Dar'a governorate and Suran in Hama governorate.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours one humanitarian operation was carried out in the Sakhur-3 district of Aleppo city, during which approximately 3 tons of humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians.

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (12 December 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, one ceasefire regime agreement has been signed with a populated area in Tartus governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,046.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of armed groups in Mu'addamiyat al-Shaykh in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups which have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 94.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 43 reports of shelling by armed groups in Aleppo governorate (20), Damascus governorate (19), Hama governorate (2), Ladhhiqiyah governorate (1) and Qunaytirah governorate (1).

In Damascus governorate, armed elements affiliated with the Army of Islam opposition group used mortars and small arms to fire on Jawbar (three times), Buzaynah, Maydan and Kafr Batna, the highway near Hawsh al-Faddaliyah and a farm near Harasta.

In Ladhhiqiyah governorate, armed elements of the Ahrar al-Sham group used mortars to shell government troop positions near the Abu Ali mountain.

Armed elements of the Free Syrian Army used mortars to shell the Ard al-Sabbagh, Furqan and Salah al-Din neighbourhoods in Aleppo city.

In Aleppo governorate, units of the terrorist organization Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Nusrah Front) used multiple-launch rocket systems, mortars and small arms to fire on the Dahiyat al-Assad, Jam'iyat al-Fayha' (twice), Binyamin, Maqamat (twice), Ramusah (twice), Shaykh Sa'd (twice), Amri, Tariq Hasan, Jam'iyat al-Zahra', Ashrafiyah and Tanbud neighbourhoods, the Assad Military Academy and the watermelon market in Aleppo city.

In Damascus governorate, terrorists shelled Jawbar (three times), Irbin (twice), Harasta, Hawsh Nasri (twice) and Bala al-Qadimah, the area near the Qusayr farm, and the Wafidin camp.

Terrorists shelled Jabha in Qunaytirah governorate; and Suran and Ma'an in Hama governorate.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, three humanitarian operations were carried out, during which the following humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians in temporary accommodation facilities in the eastern part of Aleppo city:

- Approximately 1 ton to the Azizi district
- Approximately 1 ton to the Shaykh Maqsud district
- Approximately 1.5 tons to the Mahalij district

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
19 December 2016

Original: English

Uruguay: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its determination to combat impunity for all those responsible for serious international crimes and the necessity of all persons indicted by the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") being brought to justice,

Recalling its resolutions 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993, 1503 (2003) of 28 August 2003, 1534 (2004) of 26 March 2004, 1966 (2010) of 22 December 2010, 2256 (2015) of 22 December 2015 and 2306 (2016) of 6 September 2016,

Recalling the appointment of Judge Burton Hall by the Secretary-General as a judge of the ICTY to be assigned on an ad hoc and temporary basis to the Appeals Chamber,

Taking note of the letter to the President of the Council from the Secretary-General dated 11 November 2016 (S/2016/959), attaching a letter from the President of the ICTY dated 4 November 2016,

Taking into account the assessment by the ICTY in its Completion Strategy Report (S/2016/976), and the trial and appeal schedules,

Noting the concerns expressed by the President of the ICTY about staffing, and *reaffirming* that staff retention is essential for the most expeditious completion of the ICTY's work,

Having regard to Article 16 of the Statute of the ICTY,

Having considered the nomination by the Secretary-General to reappoint Mr. Serge Brammertz as Prosecutor of the ICTY (S/2016/959),

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* its request to the ICTY to complete its work and facilitate the closure of the Tribunal as expeditiously as possible with the aim of completing the transition to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals ("the Mechanism") and, in light of resolution 1966 (2010), to redouble its efforts to review its projected case completion dates with a view towards shortening them as appropriate and to prevent any additional delays;

2. *Takes note* of the commitment of the ICTY to complete its judicial work no later than 30 November 2017;



3. *Takes note* of the request of the President of the ICTY for a final extension of the terms of office of the permanent judges of the ICTY, until 30 November 2017 or until the completion of the cases to which they are or will be assigned, if sooner, and *strongly emphasizes* that the following extensions and reappointment should be final;

4. *Decides* under this condition:

(a) To extend the terms of office of the following permanent judges of the ICTY, who are members of the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber, until 30 November 2017 or until the completion of the cases to which they are or will be assigned, if sooner:

Carmel Agius (Malta)
Liu Daqun (China)
Christoph Flüge (Germany)
Theodor Meron (United States of America)
Bakone Justice Moloto (South Africa)
Alphons Orie (The Netherlands)
Fausto Pocar (Italy)

(b) To reappoint Mr. Serge Brammertz as Prosecutor of the ICTY, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 16, paragraph 4, of the Statute of the ICTY related to the length of the term of office of the Prosecutor, for a term with effect from 1 January 2017 until 30 November 2017, which is subject to earlier termination by the Security Council upon the completion of the work of the ICTY;

5. *Decides* to extend the term of office of Judge Carmel Agius as President of the ICTY until 31 December 2017 or until one month after the completion of the cases referred to in paragraph 4 above, if sooner;

6. *Underlines* that States should cooperate fully with the ICTY, as well as with the Mechanism;

7. *Commends* the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) for the evaluation and recommendations made pursuant to resolution 2256 (2015), issued in the Report of the OIOS on Evaluation of the Methods and Work of the ICTY (S/2016/441), and *encourages* the ICTY to continue reporting on its implementation in its next six-monthly report to the Council on progress towards implementation of the ICTY Completion Strategy, without prejudice to the primacy given to the completion of its work;

8. *Welcomes* the adoption of the "Code of Professional Conduct for the Judges of the Tribunal", and *emphasizes* the importance of developing a disciplinary mechanism for judges;

9. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.: General
19 December 2016

Original: English

Note verbale dated 14 December 2016 from the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Sudan to the United Nations presents its compliments to the President of the Security Council and has the honour to forward the speech delivered on 14 December 2016 by the President of the Republic of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, on the commencement of a national dialogue (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Sudan to the United Nations should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.



**Annex to the note verbale dated 14 December 2016 from the
Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

**Speech of the President of the Republic of South Sudan
announcing the commencement of national dialogue**

Your Excellency, First Vice-President of the Republic,
Your Excellency, Vice-President of the Republic,
Right Honourable Speaker of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly,
Right Honourable Speaker of the Council of States,
Members of this August House,
Members of the diplomatic corps,
Fellow citizens,

I wish to extend my warm greetings to all of you during this festive season. I want to extend special greetings and sympathies to our people in the internally displaced and refugee camps and to all South Sudanese living around the world.

Like all of you, I am deeply concerned about the current direction our country is taking. I am particularly concerned about the recent reports of rising hatred, divisions and tensions, all of which are rapidly eating away at our social fabric.

I am deeply concerned about the parents who can no longer feed their children because of our shrinking economy.

I am also concerned about the growing number of street children and women who have lost everything due to the ongoing political situation. I am deeply concerned that all our citizens are distraught over the current political conflict and drastically declining economy.

In this festive season, I have come before you to share your Government's efforts to end the conflict and to consolidate peace in the country.

As your leaders, we have both a moral and a constitutional responsibility to protect and preserve the unity of our people, end the suffering, restore the economy and refocus on the State and on nation-building.

As you are all aware, our country descended into political crisis in 2013, as a result of an unconventional struggle for power.

The political crisis was immediately followed by extreme violence that shook the foundation of our young republic. As a result of these developments, our country is deeply divided, and the continuing conflict is threatening to tear it apart.

As long as I am your President, I will not allow the suffering of our people to continue, and I will not also allow this country to fall apart.

All my comrades and I fought for this country, not to tear it apart, but to preserve its unity, guarantee its economic viability and ensure enduring freedom and

equality for its people. And so, on this special day, I am calling upon all of you to embrace unity by addressing national unity.

National unity is the means through which we can preserve, protect and restore the integrity of our country. In my view, national unity is a function of dialogue and consensus-building. Unity is the coming together of all our people to work together to develop a vision to guide our country for generations to come.

In pursuit of national unity and reconciliation, your Government has undertaken many efforts in an attempt to bring the conflict to an end and to create a favourable environment in which to reconstitute national consensus. These efforts have resulted in the signing of the Agreement on the Reunification of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which essentially addressed all the issues that created discord within the party.

We have also signed the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, which settled political and military aspects of the conflict. While these agreements have, to a larger extent, addressed many political issues, there remain a number of fundamental issues that require a much broader South Sudanese forum. In particular, our political settlements have often ignored long-standing grass-roots grievances. For example, the SPLM Reunification Agreement and the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict have narrowly addressed the power and military aspects of the conflict.

To link political settlements with grassroots grievances, the next stage, therefore, requires the participation of the broader South Sudanese population, in order to fully restore peace and tranquillity in the country.

As a measure to consolidate peace in our country and to bring our people together, I am initiating the process of national dialogue.

Remember that dialogue has been a hallmark of our liberation struggle. We have always used dialogue as a mechanism to manage our differences and to recommit ourselves to our unity of purpose and our resolve to set our people free. SPLM first entered dialogue with the members of Anya-Nya 2, a process that consolidated the unity of the South Sudanese in their struggle. When the movement split in 1991, we held the first national convention in Chukudum, in 1994, where we recommitted ourselves to our unity as a measure to achieve our liberation objectives.

In 1999, we supported the Wunlit peace initiative between the Nuer and the Jieng communities, a process that served as a forerunner for SPLM unity in 2002 and 2003, when Riek Machar and Lam Akol, respectively, rejoined and were reintegrated into SPLM.

When the movement experienced turbulence in 2004, we convened a high level dialogue in Rumbek, paving the way for the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005. In 2005, we initiated the South-South Dialogue Conference, which culminated in the Juba Declaration, during which the South Sudan Defence Forces, under the leadership of the late General Paulino Matip Nhial, were successfully integrated into the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

Lastly, in 2010, just before the referendum, we held an All-Southern Sudanese Political Parties' Conference, where we agreed to unite our people to end all violence, so as to give them the golden opportunity to vote to determine their destiny.

Evidently, the people of South Sudan have quite an impressive record when it comes to dialoguing, dating as far back as the 1940s. Guided by this rich history, I have no doubt in my mind that, when the people of South Sudan come together to discuss the state of affairs in their country, they can come out united and stronger together. I strongly believe that the current situation in our country calls for a national dialogue. It calls for unity and an end to the cycle of violence and atrocities.

National dialogue, in my view, is both a forum and a process through which the people of South Sudan can gather to redefine the basis of their unity as it relates to nationhood, citizenship and a sense of belonging.

This opportunity allows the people of South Sudan to discuss issues related to the structure of the State, renegotiate the social contract and revitalize their aspirations for development and responsibility in the world of nations.

I take the view that a successful national dialogue can be realized only if and when all the people of South Sudan have broadly participated in, agreed to and accepted its agenda and outcomes.

For this to be realized, the process of national dialogue must be seen as credible, genuine and open to all the people of South Sudan, and it should have reliable guarantees for its outcomes to be accepted and implemented.

To achieve this, I am throwing the full weight of your Government behind it, but the Government will not lead or control this process.

The Government shall be a stakeholder in the national dialogue. I strongly believe in a South Sudanese-led process, and so we have identified our fellow citizens, who are persons of consensus, with stature and integrity, to steer this process.

Your Government will guarantee the safety and freedom of all the actors who are going to participate in the national dialogue, including those who are currently out of the country, some of whom are opposed to the Government.

To ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the national dialogue, your leadership will work very closely with regional, continental and international partners, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, the African Union, the Troika countries and the United Nations.

As you might be aware, my recent visits to Ethiopia, South Africa and Equatorial Guinea were aimed at mobilizing and seeking regional support for national dialogue.

Similarly, I have also sent a number of special envoys around to mobilize our partners to support the national dialogue.

The national dialogue should have an acceptable agenda and a set of parameters to guide the process. One of the parameters is for all the stakeholders to accept the fact that the national dialogue is placed within the framework of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict.

Doing this is critical, because the Agreement provides the governing framework that guides our actions, and this dialogue should not be seen as a new process. Rather, it should be seen as an expansion of the aforementioned peace agreements to accommodate all the people of South Sudan and their grievances.

The broader objectives of the national dialogue are to end violent conflicts in South Sudan, reconstitute national consensus, save the country from disintegration and usher in a new era of peace, stability and prosperity.

To achieve these goals, the following are the specific objectives of the national dialogue:

- To end all forms of violence in the country
- To redefine and re-establish stronger national unity
- To strengthen the social contract between the citizens and their State
- To address issues of diversity
- To agree on a mechanism for allocating and sharing resources
- To settle historical disputes and sources of conflict among communities
- To set the stage for an integrated and inclusive national development strategy and economic recovery
- To agree on steps and guarantees to ensure safe, free, fair and peaceful elections and post-election transition in 2018
- To agree on a modality for the speedier and safe return of our internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes
- To further national healing, peace and reconciliation

To ensure the integrity and credibility of its outcomes, the national dialogue process shall go through the following steps:

- As your President, I shall personally be the patron of the national dialogue
- A national committee of eminent personalities and persons of consensus will be instituted to steer the process
- The committee will be tasked primarily with developing the agenda for national dialogue and facilitating its process
- The committee will work closely with our experts, resource persons and eminent persons to help in the facilitation of the process, with a secretariat made up of the three nationally based think tanks: the Sudd Institute, the Ebony Centre for Strategic Studies and the Centre for Peace and Development Studies at the University of Juba and assisted by representatives of the Council of Churches and the Islamic Council

- Once the agenda is developed and accepted by the stakeholders, the committee shall issue a schedule or a timetable for the process
- The resolutions of the national dialogue process, once accepted, shall be binding on all the stakeholders

The national dialogue shall undergo three different phases

The first phase shall largely deal with grass-roots consultations. The broader aim of these consultations shall be to map out grievances that are unique to each community and those that are regional or national, in order to deal with these issues at an appropriate level.

The second step is to convene regional peace conferences. These conferences shall bring communities in each region together to discuss and resolve outstanding intercommunal conflicts and pass resolutions, which shall be forwarded to the national conference, as necessary.

The objective of these conferences is to initiate dialogue at the grass-roots level, particularly among the bordering communities, which have unique and localized disputes that should be resolved at that level. At each conference, major issues shall be identified, discussed and resolved, and those resolutions shall be locally and nationally adopted.

The third and final stage is to convene the national conference in Juba.

The national conference shall tackle the remaining issues that are not addressed in the subnational processes, which would have a direct bearing on national cohesion. At this stage, the resolutions adopted at the national conference shall go into different national processes, such as the constitutional, peacemaking, healing and reconciliation processes.

The steering committee of eminent persons shall also recommend additional steps for the national dialogue.

At the end of this exercise, our people shall be more united, and peace will finally return to every corner of our country.

Fellow citizens,

In the light of this national endeavour, I am calling upon all of you to forgive one another, enter into dialogue with one another in your personal capacities, embrace one another and consider yourselves equal citizens of this great country.

In the spirit of national unity, forgiveness and dialogue, I am asking you, the people of South Sudan, to forgive me for any mistakes I might have committed.

This is the spirit that our country needs, and we must act now.

I pledge to all of you fellow citizens that, as the New Year dawns upon us, I will leave no stone unturned in the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in our great country.

I call upon those still carrying arms to stop destroying their own homes and their own country and to join the process of national dialogue.

I also call upon our national army and all the security organs to uphold their constitutional mandate to protect all the citizens and their properties.

I promise that no grievances will be left unaddressed in this process.

We can achieve great things together if we talk and discuss our issues peacefully.

I also call upon those propagating hate speech in social media and in international and local forums to stop tearing their country and their communities apart.

We are bound together as one people, one nation, and we cannot allow our political and social disappointments to destroy our unity.

My Government will take serious measures against those who are found to be broadcasting ethnic hatred and who refuse to renounce violence and join peaceful dialogue.

Finally, fellow citizens, I call upon all of you to stop any propaganda against the international community, especially the American people and the United Nations.

I need to remind you that the international community has always stood by us. Therefore, we cannot turn our own frustrations into hatred against them. As friends, we must work together with them in the spirit of building our nation.

I appeal to the members of the international community, as well, to support the Government, national dialogue efforts and the entire peace implementation process.

We are grateful for the continued humanitarian support and request the resumption of development assistance.

I likewise urge the international community, in the spirit of national dialogue, to also cease any negative propaganda against the people and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan.

My fellow citizens, I want to conclude my call for national dialogue by directing SPLA and SPLA in Opposition to immediately cease hostilities, protect their fellow citizens and prepare the ground for a more peaceful, secure and joyous Christmas and New Year.

I direct all the security forces to support a broad-based national dialogue and to ensure that they provide an enabling environment for this national project.

To you, members of this August House, as you go on recess in your constituencies, I want you to sensitize our citizens to the need to understand and support this national dialogue.

More importantly, my comrades, Taban Deng Gai and James Wani Igga, and I will also do our part in the process of national dialogue.

We will hold peace rallies, starting here in Juba and around the country, to educate and prepare our people for peace and reconciliation.

We will provide any political will needed to make this national dialogue a reality.

I have already directed the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning and his team to mobilize the necessary resources for the national dialogue process.

Fellow citizens, I wish all of you a Merry Christmas and a peaceful, prosperous New Year.

May God bless us all and may He bless the Republic of South Sudan.

Thank you all.

(Signed) Salva **Kiir Mayardit**
President of the Republic of South Sudan



**General Assembly
Security Council**

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16 December 2016

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**General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict**

**Security Council
Seventy-first year**

**Letter dated 14 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative
of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to attach hereto the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the occasion of the forty-second anniversary of the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 3314 (XXIX) entitled "Definition of Aggression" (see annex).

I would appreciate your having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Volodymyr Yelchenko
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-22346 (E) 281216



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Annex to the letter dated 14 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the occasion of the forty-second anniversary of the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 3314 (XXIX) entitled "Definition of Aggression"

14 December 2016 marks the forty-second anniversary of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) entitled "Definition of Aggression".

Having illegally occupied the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and carried out further military intervention in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the Russian Federation initiated an unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine. The Russian Federation thus has blatantly violated its international obligations and commitments as envisaged under the Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Final Act), the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 1997 Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership. The Russian Federation has not only violated the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, it has also threatened international peace and security. The third year of Russia's military aggression continues to bring pain and suffering to the people of Ukraine of all ethnic backgrounds. The total number of victims of this undeclared war in the heart of Europe exceeds 10,000.

In view of this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine continues to affirm, in clear and unequivocal terms, that the occupation and subsequent attempt to annex the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as Russia's illegal actions in Donbas, fall squarely under the definition of an act of aggression, in line with the provisions of paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g) of article 3 set out in the annex to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX). Such actions constitute the most serious crime against international peace, which entails the international responsibility of the Russian Federation as a State and the international criminal responsibility of its senior leadership.

The Russian Federation is a party to an international armed conflict currently under way in our country, and the political and military leadership of Russia bears full responsibility for its planning, preparation, initiation and waging, as well as responsibility for numerous human casualties, material damage and destruction.

No political, economic or military considerations can justify the treacherous Russian aggression against Ukraine. War cannot be a means of doing politics in the twenty-first century.

Ukraine is grateful to the States Members of the United Nations for their consistent and strong support in countering Russian aggression and overcoming its consequences. We call for increasing international pressure on the Russian Federation in order to stop the aggression and bring about complete withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine of the Russian armed forces and Russian-controlled illegal armed groups and mercenaries, along with the removal of weapons and

military equipment deployed in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) or illegally transferred to the terrorist organizations "Donetsk People's Republic" and "Luhansk People's Republic", as well as to revoke all acts aimed at legitimizing the attempted annexation of the Crimean peninsula and to undertake its further de-occupation.

Only Ukraine's full control over the entire length of its State border and firm guarantees of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence can safeguard international peace and security.

14 December 2016

**Security Council**Distr.: General
14 December 2016

Original: English

**Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014),
2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) and 2258 (2015)****Report of the Secretary-General****I. Introduction**

1. The present report is the thirty-fourth submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014), paragraph 10 of Council resolution 2165 (2014), paragraph 5 of Council resolution 2191 (2014) and paragraph 5 of Council resolution 2258 (2015), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, every 30 days, on the implementation of the resolutions by all parties to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic.

2. The information contained herein is based on the data available to United Nations agencies on the ground, from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, other Syrian sources and open sources. Data from United Nations agencies on their humanitarian deliveries have been reported for the period from 1 to 30 November 2016.

Box 1**Key points in November 2016**

(1) Continuing fighting in Aleppo, especially the intensification of ground and aerial fighting in eastern Aleppo after 15 November, resulted in the deaths of hundreds and the displacement of tens of thousands of people by the end of the month. The United Nations developed a four-point plan early in November to conduct critical medical evacuations, provide health and medical supplies, provide food and other essential relief items and rotate doctors. Notwithstanding the best efforts of the United Nations and its partners, it was not possible to reach agreement among the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Russian Federation and non-State armed groups on the implementation of the plan.

(2) In November, four inter-agency convoys delivered assistance to 167,500 people in besieged and hard-to-reach locations, of a total of 904,500 people (19 per cent) requested under the inter-agency convoy plan. Six attempted convoys were unable to proceed to their mission areas owing to a combination of insecurity, political disagreements and lack of approvals at checkpoints.



(3) Operations around Raqqah and Bab resulted in the displacement of some 11,000 people. It is estimated that more than 500,000 people are in need in those two areas. Displacement in Bab has been caused by clashes between non-State armed opposition groups and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), but Syrian government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces have also moved closer to the city of Bab, with the possibility of further humanitarian need owing to conflict among the various parties.

(4) The United Nations and health partners received credible reports of 26 attacks against medical facilities, and the United Nations verified 4 attacks against educational facilities in November.

(5) On 22 November, the United Nations resumed life-saving humanitarian assistance to an estimated 85,000 stranded Syrians along the Jordanian-Syrian border. The deliveries are being channelled through a newly constructed distribution point. In addition, the construction of a new service facility that includes a health clinic, water tanks and a water-pumping station is under way.

II. Major developments

3. November saw a notable military escalation in the Syrian Arab Republic compared with previous months, which resulted in the death and injury of civilians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. Hospitals and schools continued to be attacked regularly. Insecurity from the fighting remained a major factor limiting the ability of United Nations agencies and their partners to deliver much-needed humanitarian assistance. Heavy fighting continued nationwide, including in Aleppo, Damascus, Dayr al-Zawr, Hama, Idlib and Rif Dimashq governorates.

4. Aleppo remained a particular focus for humanitarians. Early in November, the United Nations developed a four-point plan to provide humanitarian assistance to besieged eastern Aleppo. The plan envisaged: (a) critical medical evacuations; (b) the provision of health and medical supplies; (c) the provision of food and other essential relief items; and (d) the rotation of medical personnel. Notwithstanding tireless efforts by all parties, verbal approval from the Russian Federation and a preliminary written agreement from the non-State armed opposition groups, it was not possible to reach simultaneous agreement with all parties on the implementation of the plan. The Russian Federation and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic also unilaterally declared a 10-hour cessation of hostilities on 4 November and on 25 November, when crossing points were opened for civilians and fighters from non-State armed opposition groups to evacuate from eastern Aleppo. There were no reports of the crossing points being used during those periods.

5. The need for humanitarian assistance increased during the reporting period, with the last World Food Programme (WFP) food basket (prepositioned before the siege of eastern Aleppo in July) being distributed on 13 November. On 15 November, a major offensive was announced by the Russian Federation, resulting in renewed bombing in eastern Aleppo. The ensuing ground and aerial offensive reportedly killed and injured hundreds and displaced an estimated 30,500 people over five days. Some 18,500 people have been displaced to government-controlled areas, 8,000 moved to Kurdish-controlled Shaykh Maqsur and thousands

moved to other parts of eastern Aleppo. Reports of the detention of people crossing into government-controlled areas on 28 and 29 November have emerged, and at least 45 civilians, including at least 15 children, were reportedly killed and dozens more injured by shelling on 30 November as they sought to cross into western Aleppo. Fighting continued to escalate throughout November and, by the end of the month, an area representing 40 per cent of besieged eastern Aleppo had been taken by the Government.

6. The situation in western Aleppo also deteriorated throughout the month as shelling increased, with hundreds of mortars killing scores of people. Significant displacement also constituted a major challenge for western Aleppo. The 18,500 newly displaced individuals from the east joined another 24,000 people displaced by the shelling in the west in the final quarter of November. The newly arrived brought the total estimated number of displaced persons in western Aleppo to 400,000 since the beginning of the conflict in 2011, with an estimated 77,000 residing in unfinished buildings or collective shelters.

7. On 22 November, the United Nations resumed life-saving humanitarian assistance at the berm on the Jordanian-Syrian border. Food and essential items were delivered on 22, 23 and 28 November. Following a brief suspension owing to insecurity and crowd control issues, delivery resumed on 30 November. In total, more than 7,000 people in the Rukban community received assistance in preparation for the winter months. The deliveries are being channelled through a newly constructed distribution point. In addition, a new service facility that includes a health clinic, water tanks and a water-pumping station is being constructed.

8. North of Aleppo city, a number of parties to the conflict advanced to within kilometres of the ISIL-controlled city of Bab, with the fighting resulting in further displacement of civilians. From 23 to 25 November, fighting on the outskirts of the city between the Free Syrian Army and ISIL is reported to have displaced an estimated 6,000 people, many of whom moved towards the nearby districts of Manbij and I'zaz. Syrian government forces and Syrian Democratic Forces are also moving closer to the city of Bab, with the possibility of further humanitarian need among the various parties. There are an estimated 150,000 people in Bab district, including 23,000 in the city itself, some 110,000 of whom have been assessed to be in need of humanitarian assistance.

9. Anti-ISIL operations also resumed north of the city of Raqqah on 6 November, resulting in the displacement of thousands. An estimated 5,000 people are currently displaced into territory around Ayn Isa, with the Syrian Democratic Forces having moved to within 20 km of the city of Raqqah. Following the fighting, some 3,000 people were able to return to their homes. There are also unconfirmed reports of people moving within ISIL-controlled areas. There are reportedly serious health and protection concerns for those escaping from ISIL-controlled areas, in particular women and children. More than 400,000 people are estimated to be in need in the city of Raqqah and the surrounding district.

10. After a number of local agreements were reached in October, the parties continued discussions in November with a view to reaching additional agreements. An agreement between the local committee in the besieged location of Khan al-Shih and the Government resulted in the evacuation of some 3,000 people to Idlib on 28 and 30 November. Serious health, protection and food security issues were reported to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), although humanitarian access continued to be denied to

the United Nations. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the agreement reportedly included the movement of all civilians to hosting centres near Khan al-Shih. Following a resumption of aerial bombardment in Wa'r, a five-day truce was reportedly reached on 29 November. In addition, discussions continued in Qadsayya and Tall.

Box 2


Idlib governorate

(1) Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, non-State armed opposition groups have been very active in Idlib governorate, a rural governorate east of Aleppo bordering Turkey (see map in annex). Idlib has direct access to Turkey through the Bab al-Hawa border crossing and various smaller unofficial border crossings. The population of Idlib is estimated to be around 2 million people, including 700,000 internally displaced persons.

(2) Idlib is currently the only governorate that is almost exclusively controlled by non-State armed opposition groups (with the exception of the towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya, which are besieged by non-State armed opposition groups). Idlib has been the destination of recent evacuees arriving from other besieged areas following local agreements, with more than 7,000 fighters and their families having moved to the governorate since late August (from Darayya, Mu'addamiyah, Qadsayya and Khan al-Shih).

(3) The governorate has also sustained significant fighting and attacks, resulting in the death of civilians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. The frequency of attacks on schools presents such a risk to pupils across the governorate that all school activities were suspended on multiple occasions in the 30 days before 20 November. Attacks on hospitals have also been reported, with two having been attacked in November. In addition to aerial bombardment, attacks against the besieged towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya have also been reported.

Figure 1
Key dates in November 2016



Protection

11. The protection of civilians has been consistently identified as a significant area of concern in all governorates, with some 13.5 million people in need of protection and assistance. Indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, especially against medical personnel and facilities and against schools, educational staff and school children, continued to be reported in November (see paras. 14-16). Threats from explosive ordnance and against women and the most vulnerable civilians, such as children, older persons or persons with disabilities, as well as other violations and human rights abuses, were also reported.

12. On the basis of information received by OHCHR, the killing of civilians and other abuses and violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law continued throughout the reporting period. Violence occurred in, inter alia, Aleppo, Raqqah, Damascus and Rif Dimashq, Dar'a, Dayr al-Zawr and Idlib governorates (see table 1). OHCHR documented attacks by all parties to the conflict, including government forces, non-State armed opposition groups and designated terrorist groups. In addition to the violations documented by OHCHR, the Government continued to provide OHCHR with information on alleged violations. In a note verbale dated 23 November, the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic provided OHCHR with a list of incidents that allegedly occurred in the period from 7 to 20 November in Aleppo, Damascus, Rif Dimashq, Dar'a, Dayr al-Zawr, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates. A total of 52 civilians were reportedly killed and more than 72, including women and children, were injured. Casualties resulting from mortars, rocket fire, sniper fire and improvised explosive devices were reported.

Table 1
Reported attacks against civilians, November 2016^a

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Type of attack</i>	<i>Number of people killed, including women and children</i>	<i>Number of people injured</i>	<i>Infrastructure or site type</i>
<i>Aleppo governorate</i>					
4 November	Kafr Naha	Air strike	10, including 3 women and 5 children	—	Residential
5 November	Kafr Naha	Air strike	4	—	Residential
5 November	Darat Izzah	Air strike	9	Dozens	Residential
6 November	Darat Izzah	Air strike	11 children	Dozens	Residential
11 November	Kafr Da'il	Air strike	9, including 3 children	—	—
13 November	Salihin (Aleppo city)	Air strike	At least 11	—	Residential
14 November	Atarib	Air strike	3	—	Hospital

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Type of attack</i>	<i>Number of people killed, including women and children</i>	<i>Number of people injured</i>	<i>Infrastructure or site type</i>
16 November	Masakin Hannanu, Sakhur, Ansari, Shi'ar, Tariq al-Bab, Salah al-Din, Firdaws, Sukkari and Karm al-Bik (Aleppo city)	Air and ground strikes	At least 35, including 4 children	Unknown	Residential
19 November	Sakhur	Bomb (allegedly toxic)	6, including 4 children	—	Residential
20 November	Sakhur, Sayf al-Dawlah, Masakin Hannanu (Aleppo city)	Air strike	At least 29	At least 150	Residential and medical
22 November	Aleppo city	Air strike	8	—	—
24 November	Mashhad, Bab al-Nayrab, Sukkari and Maysan (Aleppo city)	Air strike	At least 35, including 2 children	—	—
27 November	Furqan (Aleppo city)	Ground strike	3, including 1 child	—	Residential
28 November	Halab al-Jadidah, Bab al-Faraj, Isma'iliyah, Furqan, Maysalun and Jabiriyah (Aleppo city)	Ground strike	7	32	Residential
29 November	Bab al-Nayrab, Salihin, Ansari, Karm al-Maysar, Karm al-Bik and Salah al-Din (Aleppo city)	Air strike	51	Dozens	—
30 November	Jubb al-Qubbah (Aleppo city)	Ground strike	At least 45, including at least 15 children	Dozens	—
30 November	Aleppo city	Ground strike	8, including 2 children	7	—
<i>Raqqah governorate</i>					
9 November	Hishah	Air and ground strikes	23, including 6 women and 4 children	At least 30	Residential
19 November	Ba'th	Ground strike	7, including 1 child	Unknown	Residential
19 November	Abbarah	Air strike	1 woman and 1 child	—	—
21 November	Salihyah	Air strike	9	—	Residential

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Type of attack</i>	<i>Number of people killed, including women and children</i>	<i>Number of people injured</i>	<i>Activities or site type</i>
24 November	Quli	Air strike	7, including 4 women	13	Funeral procession
<i>Damascus governorate</i>					
10 November	Muhajirin	Ground strike	—	2 women	Residential
10 November	Muhajirin	Ground strike	—	7, including 3 children	School
10 November	Dahiyat al-Assad	Ground strike	1	3	Residential
18 November	Mazzah, Mazra'ah and Muhajirin	Ground strike	1 woman	3	Residential
24 November	Dahiyat al-Assad	Ground strike	6	—	Residential
<i>Dar'a governorate</i>					
23 November	Jasim	Air strike	7, including at least 1 child	At least 2 women	Residential and commercial
<i>Dayr al-Zawr governorate</i>					
23 November	Marrat	Air strike	2 women and 3 children	—	Residential
25 November	Hatla	Air strike	5, including 1 child	At least 3	Residential
27 November	Hamidiyah (Dayr al-Zawr city)	Air strike	23, including 3 women and 2 children	Several	Residential
28 November	Mustafeen (Dayr al-Zawr city)	Air strike	1 woman	6	—
<i>Idlib governorate</i>					
8 November	Khan Shaykhun	Air strike	1 woman and 5 children	Dozens	Residential
9 November	Mishmishan	Air strike	5 women and 2 children	—	Residential
13 November	Binnish	Air strike	—	6	Hospital
13 November	Khan Shaykhun	Air strike	1 woman and 4 children	—	—
<i>Rif Dimashq governorate</i>					
3 November	Duma	Air strike	3	Several	Residential
6 November	Duma	Air and ground strikes	5, including 1 child	—	Residential

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Type of attack</i>	<i>Number of people killed, including women and children</i>	<i>Number of people injured</i>	<i>Infrastructure or site type</i>
6 November	Hammuriyah	Ground strike	7, including 2 women and 4 children	Several	Residential
6 November	Harasta	Ground strike	6 children	27, including children	School
10 November	Duma	Air and ground strikes	8, including 2 women and 3 children	At least 4	Residential
10 November	Saqba	Air strike	2 women	Several	Residential
14 November	Buqayn	Sniper	1	—	—
14 November	Khan al-Shih	Air strike	—	3	Civil defence centre
17 November	Khan al-Shih	Ground strike	—	—	School
17 November	Duma	Air and ground strikes	6, including 1 woman and 3 children	—	Residential
18 November	Duma	Air and ground strikes	1 woman and 3 children	3	Residential
18 November	Jisrayn	Air strikes	1 woman and 3 children	—	Residential
20 November	Nashabiyah	Air and ground strikes	1 child	—	School
21 November	Harasta	Ground strikes	2, including 1 woman	—	Residential
24 November	Duma	Air strikes	1	Several	Residential
25 November	Duma	Ground strike	3, including 2 children	At least 1	Residential

Source: OHCHR.

⁴⁰ In line with resolution 2258 (2015), the present description of developments on the ground relates to the compliance with resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014) by all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic. The information is provided without prejudice to the work of the Task Force on the Ceasefire of the International Syria Support Group. The list is not exhaustive.

13. The United States Department of Defense publicly confirmed that in November, the United States-led coalition carried out at least 321 strikes against ISIL targets in Aleppo, Dayr al-Zawr, Hasakah, Homs Idlib and Raqqah governorates. The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation reported having conducted military operations in support of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, stressing that it had not carried out strikes within 10 km of the city of Aleppo since 18 October.

14. Primary, secondary and tertiary health-care services continued to experience severe gaps in performance and service delivery, owing to the extensive damage caused to health-care facilities, the rapid turnover in health staff and the lack of qualified professionals in specialized medical fields. Paediatric and maternal health-care services, including routine vaccinations, remained negatively affected, especially in Aleppo, Dar'a, Hama and Homs governorates and in the besieged areas of Rif Dimashq governorate.

15. In blatant disregard for the protected status of medical facilities under international humanitarian law, as further articulated by the Security Council in its resolution 2286 (2016), such facilities continued to be damaged or destroyed by fighting. The United Nations and health partners received credible reports of 26 attacks against medical facilities from 1 to 29 November. Hospitals were the most affected: 10 in Aleppo, 2 in Idlib, 1 in Hama and 2 in Rif Dimashq. Two primary health-care centres in Homs, a health-care centre in eastern Aleppo and an ambulatory service in western Aleppo were also struck. In addition, a medical warehouse in eastern Aleppo and three ambulances in eastern Ghutah, Hama and Kafr Batna were struck. The attacks resulted in multiple civilian casualties, including the deaths of at least 5 health workers and the injury of 15 health workers.

16. Educational facilities continued to be the subject of a number of attacks, with four verified attacks reported by the United Nations during the reporting period. On 6 November, a mortar struck the yard of the Rawdat Ajyal al-Mustaqbal kindergarten in Harasta, eastern Ghutah, Rif Dimashq governorate, killing 8 children and injuring 20 others. On 13 November, an air strike struck and destroyed the Atarib primary school in Atarib, Aleppo governorate. The school has 580 students, but was closed on the day of the attack owing to the ongoing bombing of the area. An 8-year-old girl in a house near the school reportedly died as a result of the attack. On 20 November, two rockets mortars struck two schools in the western part of Aleppo city. One rocket struck the Furqan primary school, killing 8 pupils and injuring more than 20 others and a teacher. The second rocket mortar struck the Sariyah Hassun school but did not explode. On 20 November, a mortar struck Qarma primary school in Nashabiyah, Rif Damashq governorate, killing 3 children and injuring 15 others. At least two female teachers were also injured. On 17 November, intense shelling continued to strike the Khan al-Shih camp. Beira school, an UNRWA school within the premises of the camp, sustained major damage as a result. The school was empty, however, and no casualties were reported.

17. On 22 November, a Kurdish journalist was reportedly abducted and beaten by members of Yekineyên Parastina Gel (YPG) military intelligence in Hasakah city. The victim managed to escape from the abductors while they were arguing and reached the nearby village of Khama'a.

Humanitarian access

Box 3

Key points

(1) In November, four inter-agency convoys delivered assistance to 167,500 people in besieged and hard-to-reach locations, of a total of 904,500 people (19 per cent) requested under the inter-agency convoy plan.

(2) More than 20,000 medical items were removed from inter-agency convoys in November by Syrian authorities.

(3) The inter-agency convoy plan for December was submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 17 November. A response from the Ministry was received on 1 December. All locations were approved or partially approved, including eastern Aleppo city. In total, 798,200 of the 930,250 requested beneficiaries (85.8 per cent) were approved, and 132,050 beneficiaries (14.2 per cent) requested under the plan were not included in the approved number of beneficiaries.


(4) During the reporting period, some 760,000 beneficiaries were assisted by the United Nations and its partners through cross-border operations from Turkey and Jordan.

18. The delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need of assistance in the Syrian Arab Republic remained extremely challenging in many areas of the country as a result of active conflict, shifting conflict lines and deliberate restrictions on the movement of people and goods by the parties to the conflict.

19. Access to the millions of people living in besieged and hard-to-reach locations remained of critical concern. Throughout November, as a result of delays in the issuance of facilitation letters, requirements for additional security approvals above and beyond the two steps agreed with the Government in April, a lack of adherence to agreed protocols at checkpoints and insecurity, only four inter-agency convoys reached a total of 167,500 people in five besieged and hard-to-reach locations (see table 5). This total constitutes about 19 per cent of the total of 904,500 people to whom access had been requested under the plan. In addition, the United Nations provided assistance to some of these areas through single-agency convoys. Moreover, non-governmental organizations continued to provide medical, educational and protection services, as well as some support in other sectors, in hard-to-reach locations, under extremely challenging circumstances.

Figure 11

United Nations inter-agency cross-line humanitarian operations: number of people reached each month in besieged areas, including via airdrops to the city of Dayr al-Zawr



20. Six inter-agency convoys could not proceed in November, despite having prior approval from the Syrian authorities. These include Wadi Barada on 9 November, Duma on 17 November, Rastan on 20 November and Madaya, Zabadani and Fu'ah/Kafraya on 27 November. For example, on 17 November, a convoy for 70,000 people to Duma, Rif Dimashq governorate, was aborted owing to the absence of approval at the last government checkpoint to proceed without dog searches and the unsealing of the trucks. The convoy had originally been planned for 15 November, but loading could not begin owing to the lack of the requisite facilitation letters from the Government. On 9 November, a convoy to the Wadi Barada area of Rif Dimashq governorate for 30,000 people was aborted after being unable to proceed past a government checkpoint. Convoys to other locations were held up for various reasons, including insecurity, lack of agreement on the routes to be taken or the estimates of the number of people in need and a lack of final green lights from the relevant authorities. In Madaya, two people died owing to a lack of available medical care.

21. Deliberate interference and restrictions by the parties to the conflict continued to hamper aid delivery. WFP continues to be unable to gain access to populations in need in ISIL-controlled areas of the country, given that all plans to deliver assistance to those areas have been suspended because of the inability to work independently and monitor activities. This is preventing WFP from reaching Raqqah governorate and most of Dayr al-Zawr governorate, as well as pockets of northern rural Aleppo governorate, southern rural Hasakah governorate and north-western rural Hama governorate. Meanwhile, in Hasakah governorate, WFP continued to face difficulties in obtaining dispatch approvals for some of the partners, which delayed the implementation of planned activities. Negotiations are ongoing with the relevant counterparts to overcome the remaining bottlenecks. Meanwhile, owing to security concerns on the ground, UNRWA has been unable to return to Yalda/Yarmouk since 25 May 2016.

Table 2
United Nations inter-agency cross-line humanitarian operations, 1 January-30 November 2016



22. The removal of life-saving medicines and medical supplies from humanitarian aid convoys continued throughout November. Life-saving and life-sustaining medical items sufficient for 22,284 treatments were removed from an inter-agency convoy to Rastan and a single-agency World Health Organization (WHO) convoy to Qadsayya. The treatments and supplies removed from convoys in November are shown in table 3. In addition, four inter-agency convoys could not proceed in November, preventing some 120,000 medical treatments from being delivered as planned. In addition, approval for 29 requests by WHO to deliver health supplies remains pending.

Table 3
Medical supplies removed from humanitarian convoys, November 2016

Location	Number of treatments	Type of supplies
Qadsayya	5 929	All types of kits and antiseptics (reduced in quantity); anti-decongestants, atropine and vials of analgesics (completely removed); support to 20 trauma cases
Rastan	16 335	Intravenous fluids, minor surgical kit, antiseptics, decongestants and injectable analgesics (completely removed); pneumonia kits A and B, inter-agency emergency health kits and bronchodilators (reduced in quantity); several modules from family doctor practice kit (eliminated); support to 175 trauma cases; multivitamins, pneumonia kit B, antiseptics and IV fluids

23. Under the United Nations inter-agency convoy plan for November, access was requested to 25 locations, including all besieged locations, with the aim of reaching 904,500 people. In its response on 27 October, the Syrian authorities approved access to 623,000 of the requested beneficiaries (68.9 per cent). A total of 281,500 beneficiaries (31.1 per cent) requested under the plan were rejected or not included in the approved number of beneficiaries. The authorities also requested that 20 other locations should be reached in November outside the plan.

24. On 17 November, the United Nations submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the inter-agency convoy plan for December, which comprised 21 requests to reach 930,250 people in need in besieged, hard-to-reach and priority cross-line areas. A response was expected by 29 November, in line with the agreed two-step approval procedures, but was received on 1 December. All requested locations were either fully or partially approved. In total, 798,200 of the 930,250 requested beneficiaries (85.8 per cent) were approved, while 132,050 beneficiaries (14.2 per cent) were not included in the approved number of beneficiaries. Of the 28 requested locations, 13 were approved in full (46.4 per cent) and 15 were approved with a lower number of beneficiaries (53.6 per cent). The authorities also requested that 38 other locations should be reached in December outside the plan.

25. The Nusaybin/Qamishli crossing in Hasakah governorate has been temporarily closed by the Turkish authorities because of security concerns since 27 December 2015. The governorate also remains largely inaccessible by road for United Nations agencies from within the Syrian Arab Republic owing to insecurity and the presence of ISIL members along the routes. The United Nations continues airlifts from Damascus to Qamishli airport to deliver multisectoral assistance, with some 190,000 people having been reached in November.

Humanitarian response

26. In November, United Nations humanitarian agencies and partners continued to reach millions of people in need through all modalities from within the Syrian Arab Republic and across borders (see table 4). In addition to the United Nations and its partners, non-governmental organizations continued to deliver valuable assistance to people in need in line with previous months. The Government continued to provide basic services to those areas under its control and in many areas beyond its control.


Table 4
Number of people reached by United Nations organizations, November 2016

<i>Organization</i>	<i>People reached</i>
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	106 800
International Organization for Migration	28 013
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	499 933
United Nations Children's Fund	23 500 000
United Nations Development Programme	1 017 722
United Nations Population Fund	226 597

Organization	People reached
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	450 000
World Food Programme	1 918 600
World Health Organization	437 156

27. Cross-border deliveries continued from Turkey and Jordan into the Syrian Arab Republic under the terms of resolutions 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) and 2258 (2015) (see fig. III). In line with those resolutions, the United Nations notified the Syrian authorities in advance of each shipment, including its content, destination and number of beneficiaries. The United Nations Monitoring Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic continued its operations, monitoring 643 trucks used in 24 convoys in November, confirming the humanitarian nature of each and notifying the Syrian authorities after each shipment. The Mechanism continued to benefit from excellent cooperation with the Governments of Jordan and Turkey.

Figure III
Beneficiaries assisted by the United Nations and its partners per cluster through cross-border humanitarian deliveries, November 2016
(Thousands)



28. The inter-agency convoys to the besieged and hard-to-reach locations listed in table 5 were completed in November. Moreover, between 10 April and the end of November, the United Nations completed 156 airdrops of food commodities and humanitarian assistance over the city of Dayr al-Zawr. In addition, the logistics cluster continued airlifts to Qamishli from Damascus, with more than 194 airlift rotations having been completed between 9 July and the end of November. During the reporting period, United Nations agencies also undertook single-agency deliveries to cross-line and hard-to-reach locations or reached those locations through their regular programmes.

Table 5
Inter-agency cross-line humanitarian convoys, November 2016

Date	Location	Organized target (number of households)	Targeted people, reached
20 November	Rastab, Hama	107 500	107 500
28 November	Fu'ah and Kafraya	20 000	20 000
28 November	Madaya	40 000	40 000
28 November	Zabadani	1 000	1 000

Note: All assistance provided was multisectoral in nature.

29. In November, a polio immunization and multi-antigen campaign was conducted from within the Syrian Arab Republic in all governorates. The campaign targeted 977,853 children under 5 years of age, mainly in hard-to-reach and besieged areas. The besieged areas of Fu'ah, Kafraya, Madaya, Mu'addamiyah al-Sham and the Yarmouk camp were reached with vaccines. Both Idlib and Raqqah (except Tall Abyad in Raqqah) could not be reached owing to the refusal of the local authorities. In addition, parts of Aleppo, Qunaytirah and Rif Damashq governorates could not be reached because of the security situation. Overall results from the campaign are still pending. Separately, some 350,000 children were vaccinated through cross-border operations in November 2016. The antigens used were bivalent oral polio, pentavalent and measles and rubella vaccines. For the cross-border component, parts of Aleppo, Dayr al-Zawr and Raqqah governorates could not be reached owing to insecurity and fighting, affecting the vaccination of some 780,000 children in total.

Humanitarian response plan funding

30. The status of the funding of the humanitarian response plan as at 30 November is shown in figure IV.

Figure IV
Humanitarian response plan funding, 30 November 2016

(Millions of dollars)



Visas and registrations

31. A total of 35 new requests for Syrian visas for United Nations staff members were submitted in November. A total of 26 requests were approved, comprising 18 submitted in October and 8 older applications, while 49 remain pending. Moreover, a total of 36 visa renewal requests were submitted. A total of 65 renewal applications were approved, 17 of which were submitted in November. No visa renewal requests were rejected in November. Some 25 visa renewal requests remain pending, 16 of which were submitted in November.

32. A total of 17 international non-governmental organizations are registered with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to operate in the country. Four more are completing registration. Those organizations continued to face administrative hurdles and restrictions that affect their ability to operate, including in gaining permission to undertake independent needs assessments. Some 194 national non-governmental organizations are authorized to operate in the Syrian Arab Republic, with 6 added in September.

Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and premises

33. On 13 November, UNRWA tragically lost its seventeenth staff member as a result of the conflict since 2012. Reports indicate that, along with the UNRWA staff member, two people were killed in the same air strike, which struck a mosque during morning prayers in the Khan al-Shih Palestine refugee camp.

34. On 17 November, intense shelling continued to strike the Khan al-Shih camp. Beira school, an UNRWA school within the premises of the camp, sustained major damage as a result. The school was empty, however, and no casualties were reported.

35. A total of 27 United Nations staff members, 26 of whom are UNRWA staff and 1 of whom is from the United Nations Development Programme, are still detained or missing. Since the beginning of the conflict, dozens of humanitarian workers have been killed, including 20 staff members of the United Nations, 54 staff members and volunteers of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and 8 staff members and volunteers of the Palestine Red Crescent Society. In addition, many staff members of international and national non-governmental organizations are reported to have been killed.

III. Observations

36. The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate throughout the Syrian Arab Republic. The continuing conflict poses an immediate threat to millions of civilians every day, especially those under attack and those who cannot be reached. As I have previously stated, the conflict has also created a longer-term crisis, given that the bombing of schools, hospitals and other civilian installations by all parties to the conflict will continue to have a negative impact on the population for years to come. These developments are unfolding while the world watches, seemingly helpless to staunch the suffering. I call upon all parties to the conflict to consider where this will lead, as the deepening humanitarian tragedy only pushes the political solution that all have agreed is necessary further out of reach.

37. November witnessed an undeniable military acceleration and, in parallel, a serious deterioration of security for civilians. Nationwide, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has gained momentum as it seeks to retake areas, either through military force, as has been the case in eastern Aleppo, or through local agreements with communities, especially in Rif Damashq governorate. The humanitarian impact of such developments has been well documented. It is important, however, that military gains not be mistaken for the attainment of a so-called military solution. In no way will gains on the battlefield obviate the need for an inclusive and negotiated political settlement to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic. The only sustainable gains are those that are achieved through a settlement that addresses the legitimate grievances of the population.

38. It is for this reason that I continue to express my firm belief that there is no alternative to political accommodation between the parties to the conflict. Without such steps, tragedy will continue to prevail in the Syrian Arab Republic, with human, political, economic and social consequences in the country and beyond for generations to come. I and my Special Envoy will continue to engage with those actors with influence on the Syrian parties until the very last day of my tenure as Secretary-General in order to alleviate the suffering and seek an end to the conflict. Although the unfortunate reality may be that a resolution to the Syrian conflict may not occur before I leave office, the groundwork for a political solution has long been laid. It is now up to the parties to the conflict, the Member States that support them and the Security Council to take the appropriate steps necessary to finally end the suffering of the Syrian people.

Annex



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
19 December 2016
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 14 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The malicious and deceitful campaign being led by certain Western regimes at the United Nations, and in particular certain Security Council members, regarding the current situation in Aleppo comes as no surprise to the people and Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. The regimes of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and their regional proxies Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, are financing, arming and training terrorists, and then sending them across the border into Syrian territory to murder Syrians, break Syria apart and destroy its infrastructure, and eliminate anyone who fails to subscribe to their agenda. Those regimes are falling over themselves to perform one last service for those terrorists prior to their imminent collapse in the face of the blows they are being dealt by our people in Aleppo and by the people, army, allies and friends of Syria, who are sparing no effort in standing up to terrorism. As if we needed any further evidence to prove our point, witness the unprecedented hysteria of the leaders of certain Western States and their representatives in international organizations, and the feverish media campaign to discredit the leadership, army and allies of Syria in a desperate effort to thwart the imminent victory in Aleppo, turn the facts on their head, and pressure Syria to retreat from its declared policy of combating the terrorism of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Nusra Front and affiliated organizations, as well as their sponsors and backers, not only in Aleppo but in all parts of the Syrian Arab Republic. It is regrettable that, in the twenty-first century, such a shameful approach should be adopted not only by Western States that have had no compunction about committing the most repulsive genocidal crimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but also by high-level United Nations officials and agencies. The pressure has culminated in the exploitation by those States of international pulpits to further their own aims to the detriment of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law, and the steadfast struggle of Syria and its allies against terrorism.

From the start of this war, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has asserted its constitutional duty to defend its people and institutions against the threats facing them. The Government has also declared that it cannot abdicate its counter-terrorism responsibilities or allow anyone to marginalize it. Syria has done what it had pledged to do. In the course of prosecuting its war against terrorism and



protecting its citizens, Syria has adhered to international standards and cooperated with sincere and credible international institutions, both governmental and non-governmental; delivered assistance to its citizens in all parts of the country; and taken extreme care to ensure that its army's operations do not affect innocent civilians or the infrastructure of the Syrian people. In Aleppo, in particular, it has been receptive to initiatives for the evacuation of armed fighters from the city and fulfilled its pledges, even as Western States, to their resounding shame, have reneged on their commitments and policies at all levels.

As everyone at the United Nations is aware from our letters to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General, Syria has opened six crossing points for civilians and two crossing points in order to enable armed fighters to leave Aleppo before the Syrian Arab Army and its allies go about the job of liberating Syrian citizens from the carnage that has been inflicted by armed terrorist groups in eastern Aleppo for the past five years. The Syrian Government can no longer ignore the pleas of the Syrian people in both the east and the west of Aleppo for it to eliminate the armed terrorist groups that, instead of treating the people of eastern Aleppo as citizens, have enslaved them, disrupted their lives, denied them access to food, medicine, electricity and water, and made it impossible for their children to attend school. Those armed terrorist groups have shown no compunction about killing over 11,000 women and children from western Aleppo with their bombs of hate and "hell cannons", of which all the States of the world are aware. They have also launched criminal attacks against personnel of the United Nations and other organizations stationed in western Aleppo. Contrary to the misinformation disseminated by parties hostile to Syria, it was the armed terrorist groups that destroyed schools, or used them, along with the hospitals of eastern Aleppo, as bases from which to commit murder and to employ all manner of repression, threats and torture to terrorize and intimidate the people from expressing their loyalty to their homeland and their rejection of terrorism and extremism.

It is now well known that the Aleppo Eye Specialist Hospital, which was occupied by the armed terrorist groups at the onset of the troubles in Aleppo, has become a base for armed groups supported by Western States that consider them to be the "moderate opposition". That hospital was one of the most advanced ophthalmic hospitals in the Middle East, but those groups sold its equipment on the Turkish market with full knowledge of the Turkish authorities. The latest information out of Aleppo has revealed that the humanitarian assistance that certain organizations claimed they were providing to civilians was actually going to armed fighters who used it for their own terrorist purposes and prevented it from reaching civilians, in order to starve them into submission. After the liberation of neighbourhoods in eastern Aleppo, the media found arms depots full of advanced missiles and other deadly weapons that are evidence of how the States that support terrorism — whose names we will disclose at a later date — were subsidizing terrorism and the murder of Syrians. The war profiteers from Western States and their allies in certain Eastern European countries that are members of the European Union are merchants of war, death and destruction who must be held accountable for supplying those weapons to terrorist organizations to murder Syrians, including children, women and the elderly.

The allegations made in the reports and statements of certain United Nations officials, including certain officials of the Human Rights Council, are intended not

to protect human rights, but to protect the terrorists, and to justify the policies of Western States, which have turned certain United Nations officials and agencies into instruments to mislead Member States and cover up their plot to bend Syria and the entire Middle East to their nefarious policies and objectives. Those Western States have taken to calling interminable General Assembly and Security Council meetings, in yet another sign that they want to hold the United Nations hostage to their anaemic policies and use it as a platform for misleading some peoples and pressuring other States by turning the facts on their head and weeping crocodile tears, in order to isolate Syria and sap its determination in the face of terrorism, extremism, and foreign plots. Syria underscores that any attempt to put an entire people under siege, including the economic siege of Syria, represents the ultimate in violation of human rights and the right to a life of dignity.

Our Syrian people in eastern Aleppo have expressed nothing but love, friendship and gratitude to the Syrian Arab Army for having liberated them from the terrorists. They have come out in genuine, spontaneous and massive demonstrations to give voice to their pride in returning to the warm embrace of their homeland, and their gratitude to the Syrian Arab Army and its allies for freeing them from the grip of terrorism, oppression and extremism. The fact that some of those who crow the loudest about freedom and democracy have chosen to ignore this only goes to show that they have no respect for a people's democratic expression of its desire to be free of foreign intervention, its loyalty to its homeland and its love for its army, which has sacrificed its precious blood to eradicate terrorism and fight those who support it.

Syria hopes that the new year of 2017 will provide the Western States that support terrorism an opportunity to turn away from their previous practices and policies and act in good faith to put an end to the scourge of terrorism. Syria, which has been a crossroads of civilizations and religions, deserves to have the whole world stand with its people, its Government and its allies in the war against terrorism.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative